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Introduction
Within the current realities of an organically changing world, Bolivia is a country often overlooked, seldom considered
within the perspective of mitigation potential or impact effect. But this rich, diverse nation holds a narrative that is
critical within the climate debate as a whole, and an undertone that reaffirms divides and injustices that are both
apparent and expanding. Bolivia is a country of considerable relevance concerning the overwhelming potential of
their vast natural resources and future directions.
Bolivia is currently center to a growing and considerable resource extraction movement. Pressured by neighboring
countries, particularly Brazil and Argentina, Bolivia is assertively working toward agricultural production and resource
independence. The country has consistently been held within the grasps of market control and legislative influence
from outside entities. These forces often act antagonistically to progressive potential and ecological wellness,
particularly in respects to the least fiscally adaptable and most susceptible. Nevertheless, because of the current
economy, the livelihoods and prospective possibilities for many residents has dramatically changed in recent years,
instilling possibilities and hope within a country long without. Yet development comes at the expense of the vast
forests, though clearings and land-use change. From a climatic perspective, this is concerningly damaging, both to
the local ecosystem but also to global atmospheric balances. Such that Bolivia is a country of unique validity and
vulnerability but equally a case study amongst the many concurrent forces of globalization, political and economic
instability as a function of resource richness and environmental degradation that is often propagated through altruistic
purpose. Bolivia can therefore be seen as a singular constituent within the realities of a changing climate, but also an
example of the consistent and comparable global forces that propagate exploitative resource extraction and
climatically damaging practice, contrasted against the injustices and adversities imparted upon the majority
population of the country.
The many given implications of climate change might be considered as an ancillary outcome to the mechanisms of a
society, based upon the structuring of economy, policy, and social governance. As such, a society might be thus
envisioned as a three-legged stool, whereby each separate component provides a necessary and critical element to
the greater whole; without one of the three a given population might collapse. But the environment, and by an extent
global atmospheric balances, are the stage upon which these structures flourish. Without the surrounding resources
yielded from the natural world, prosperity for the common individual to the collective population would not be
possible. This paper will firstly begin by outlining the roles of markets and legislation - intertwined with civil perception
- to broach the conversation of a changing climate as the ultimately successive result of the nuances held within
Bolivia. These will be framed both from the climatic inputs and the more pressing impacts experienced. Therefore, by
outlining each leg of the stool, the root provocations of the overwhelming constitution of environmental and climatic
degradation might be unearthed. Likewise, the surroundings of the societal supports will be academically founded,
through a collective analysis of historical passing and present circumstance, but the concluding repercussions
endured will be expressed through the tellings of a local populace, such that the tales of current are nothing but the
unabridged sincerities of those impacted. Through consideration of their recounts, the complexity and
interconnectivity of climate change is conveyed; there is no silver bullet to such a disorderly and distorted
complication. But by listening to their voices, an awareness of another reality is introduced, providing a
correspondence between the North and South. The truths of a changing climate are hidden within the trivialities,
whereby their necessity is understood through aggregation. This is the story of the Bolivian peoples, and an evolving
world, told through the struggles and strife of those most closely connected to the lands. And an honoring to the
subtleties that make or break a life.
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Economy
Current Market Environs
The Plurinational State of Bolivia's economy is the 95th largest, in nominal terms, in the world; 87th in purchasing
power parity, and is classified by the World Bank as a ‘lower-middle' income country [10]. It is ranked 119th on the
Human Development Index, indicating a comparatively medium social and economic level of advancement. [53] The
country has historically been single-commodity focused, with little economic diversification; much of the economy
continues to rely on mining and hydrocarbon exports. In conjunction with mining, petroleum and natural gas
extraction and processing, the agricultural industry is a considerably valuable economic force in Bolivia. In whole and
since 2006, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Bolivia has doubled, substantiated by GDP increases
upwards of 6.8%, resulting in the extreme poverty rate falling from 38% to 18%, with much of this development owing
directly to growth within the agrarian sector and smallholder participation. [53][118]
Since the 1990s - and especially within the last decade - Bolivia has witnessed significant development in agrarian
production and industry expansion. Of the total nominal $41.833 billion that makes up Bolivia's GDP, 13.6%
belonging to the agriculture sector. [97] Much of this agricultural prosperity is centered in the Department of Santa
Cruz, which is the largest and most populated lowland province. It is also the largest of Bolivia's nine Departments
(370,621 km2), occupying 33% of national territory, and is roughly the same size as Montana. [96] The Santa Cruz
region is responsible for approximately 70% of Bolivia's nationally sourced food supply, 40% of the national tax
income, and nearly 30% of the Department's GDP. [89] As such, an estimated 1.5 million jobs are directly involved in
the agriculture sector in Santa Cruz, with properties ranging in size from 1 hectare (hA) to over 20,000 hA. [89] In
2015, approximately “40% of the Bolivian bovine stock, 62% of the milk production, 57% of the land planted, and
95% of the oilseeds planted were located in the Department of Santa Cruz. [55] Given numerous policy incentives,
along with social and economic forces, the Department has witnessed a continuous population growth, such as those
migrating from the Andean highlands or other countries, in order to take advantage of economic opportunity. And
although the lowlands represent the most expansive physiographic area in Bolivia, the population only accounts for
31% of the country’s total; 26% within the Department of Santa Cruz. [116]
Livestock production accounts for a majority of agrarian land use, with the remaining lands belonging to mechanically
intensive agriculture and smallholder land shares. Within farmed trades, soybeans are the most produced crop, by
far, dominating over half of the total cultivated production, and the chief export of the agriculture industry. [89] Other
important crops consist of maize (corn), sorghum, sunflower, wheat, rice, beans and sugar cane. Quinoa (which is
grown in the Altiplano), chia, and sesame are expanding crops as well, due to an increasing international demand.
Each crop plays a necessary role in the numerous agro-food or feed value chains; production for animal feed is a

Figure 1: High Forest in the Department of Chuquisaca
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predominant driver in the industry. [89]
Bolivia has an estimated 377,045 km2
(37,704,500 hA) of active agricultural
lands, or 34.81% of all land area, which
encompasses land that is either arable,
under permanent crop, or under
permanent pasture. [9] As such, only
44,725 km2 (4,472,500 hA) of Bolivia, or
4.13%, is arable land, which is actively
utilized for all crop production. [9] In the
lowlands, two growing seasons are
possible; one in the summer and one in
the winter. The summer growing period,
which coincides with the rainy season,
occurs anywhere from November to April,
while the winter harvest, which is the
driest time of the year, can take place
from May to October. Overall, Bolivia's
agricultural potential is great, largely due
to the abundance of fertile lands, as well
as the myriad of climatic zones. [89]

Figure 2: a) production quantities of staple crops, b) production quantities of
meats, c) production values of staple crops. [36]

Soybeans are by-in-large the most
abundantly sown crop because they are
primarily destined for export. Roughly
20% is obligatorily sold to local markets,
depending on the year, due to the
‘requirement’ to firstly satisfy national
demand. [89][36] The rest of the three
million metric tons are then semiprocessed, as either oil, oil-cake, or
soybean flour/meal, and sold
predominantly to Brazil (33%), Argentina
(12%), and the United States (10%). [75][9]
Other trade partners include China, of
which trade has just begun, Peru, South
Korea, Belgium, and Russia. [36] In this
context, it is necessary to see soybean
production in a global context: much of the
soybean production is done by foreigners
and multinational capital for a market that
returns little benefit to Bolivia. [75] Soybean
production is also highly mechanized, a
luxury within agricultural production that is
only afforded to those with the resources
to do so; soybean production is largely
concentrated within areas of ample land
size ownership. [83] It is also worth pointing
out that the global soybean market is
exhaustive - prices are relatively stable,
and profitable, so much so that producers
often prefer exportation over selling to the
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internal markets. This is largely due to the fact that Bolivia is not a completely free market; commodity values are
regularly fixed or adjusted by the government in order to maintain affordable consumer prices and ensure food
security. [89] This effectively means that Bolivia is relatively uncompetitive with any of the neighboring South American
markets, especially within the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) trade agreements. Soybean production, along
with maize and sorghum, serves to mainly satisfy the needs of livestock feed industries, both internationally and
nationally. It is also essential to note that Bolivia relies on a minor importation of livestock feed, signifying the divide
between the export-oriented interests and internal need. [89]
Bolivia's agrarian industry can be considered as broken into three sectors: mechanized agriculture, cattle ranching,
and small-scale production. [84] Cattle ranching is now the most extensive practice concerning land area affected; a
current estimated 9.3 million head of cattle graze upon cleared lands and within the forest systems of Bolivia. [36] The
Departments of Santa Cruz and Beni contain over 70% of the nation’s cattle, but production also takes place in the
Departments of Tarija and Chuquisaca, among others. [89] Given that ranching, grain and oilseed production often
share the same biomes, there exists a relationship where cattle production is typically at the forefront of land
expansion, with mechanized agriculture following suit in the more productive, valuable lands, leading to a
displacement of ranchers into untouched forested areas. [69] But this is now reversing as soil qualities degrade, where
ranching is beginning to replace soybean and sugarcane plantations; beef production is now the most common and
undertaken practice within Bolivian agriculture. [83] Cattle ranching currently satisfies the internal demand, but it is
quickly becoming saturated, where markets in Santa Cruz are selling to other Departments, and driving down prices
due to overproduction. (Field Notes)[83] Beef production has also risen alongside the dairy industry, both of which are
largely prohibited from exportation due to tariffs and quotas instated by the Bolivian government, again under the
rationale of food production security. The price of beef, when sold to the market, is anywhere from 16 to 22 Bs/Kg
(1.05 to 1.44USD/Lb), depending on location, and time of year; prices overall are generally quite low, and
uncompetitive with neighboring country production models. The cattle industry operates on a high level of informality,
and quality is often hampered by animal health conditions, such as the presence of foot-and-mouth disease. [89]
However, given that ranching is a largely accessible profession, certain challenges arise when the potential for a
stable livelihood confers a net negative ecological effect, both on the overwhelming climate and the local forest
ecosystems.
The Bolivian agricultural sector is faced with some systemic problems, many of which are limiters to end production
quantity and quality. These are primarily due to, or lack of, the following: [89][75][84]
●

●

●

Food Sanitation and Production Control: One of the chief concerns facing the production and distribution
of agrarian products within Bolivia is the lack of food safety and practice regulation. Animal health and
farmed products are without the oversight of an enforceable, regulative body; there is a high level of
informality within the industry. The public sanitation service, SENASAG, is largely underfunded and overall
ineffective at establishing standardization across the extent of various production chains. One of the central
aspects is the lack of technological or practical knowledge, particularly among smallholders and surrounding
the higher quality creation of goods. Concerning grain silo storage, there are often losses of 10 - 15% due to
vermin and mold. Meaning that, in effect, the markets do not have high quality, enforceable standards.
Productivity/Efficiency: Brazil and Argentina, along with Paraguay, heavily influence the Bolivian markets,
due to their inordinate, comparative size. Yields in Bolivia are generally lower, through a combination of
decreased performance, seed utilization, (lack of) technological implementation, and limited access to
knowledge concerning the best available agrarian practices. Seed breeding is limited, partly from the lack of
biotechnical developmental knowledge; there is also very limited access to genetically modified (transgenic)
seeds. Elsewise, poor, degradative practices, such as tillage, lack of cover crops and rotation crops, and
windbreaks, generally reduce efficiency and output.
Market Access: Because of the overwhelming majority of small and medium shareholders, much of the
Bolivian agricultural production chain depends on intermediaries, such as those for transportation, storage,
mechanical access and land rents. The bulk of farmers, excluding agro-industrial operations, do not have
access to silos, and are therefore at the whim of market prices, or else storage and rent demands. Without a
direct understanding or access to markets, there is potential for abuses and price gouging. Furthermore,
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●

●

●

exportation is relatively low - with the exception of specific cash crops such
as soybean - meaning that most production is kept internally, which can be
particularly unstable, due to international trade influence. And finally, Bolivia
is a landlocked country; without an access to the sea, the potential for export
is severely limited, especially from neighboring counties that accrue tariffs on
any production bound for an ocean port.
Institutional Limitations and Public Intervention: Governmental bodies
and organizational authorities predominately lack the resources to
meaningfully assist and regulate the agrarian sector. Managerial positions of
publicly designated bodies are politically appointed; many of these institutions
lack qualified personnel and/or funding to be effective. There is an element of
corruption throughout - contraband materials and produce often undercut
national companies. More so, because of the influence of neighboring
countries, national and state-owned enterprises are often without the power
to influence prices. Additionally, export quotas and production limitations
hamper reliability and investment potential.
Land Tenure/Security: Land ownership is not explicitly defined; the
‘socialized’ governmental body has decreed the authority to confiscate lands
at any time. Lands must demonstrate a state approved use, and there is a
constant fear of land seizure and institutional abuse.
Sustainability and a Changing Climate: Despite the rise, primarily out of
necessity, in responsible farming and land use practices, Bolivia still lags far
behind the necessary change to ensure healthy, sustainable practices.
Deforestation and pollution remain a pressing concern. Soil erosion and
compaction are on the rise, partly as a consequence of changing seasons
and rainfall patterns. Large-scale operations are attributed with heavy use of
agrochemicals, little-to-nonexistent crop rotation, and degradative practices
leading to poor soil quality. Above all, water is become a heightened issue;
droughts and seasonal invariance are adversely affecting production, which is
in combination with a sporadic use of irrigation and an overwhelming
mismanagement of water resources.

In combination with the above, agrarian taxation is likewise without shortcoming; the
current model of internal revenue generated from farmed production leaves areas that
are open for exploitation, organizational misuse and neglect. Land use taxation (Law
843 and Law 2429) is primarily dictated by land ownership size, partitioned into three
classes. [107] Land ownerships falling below 50 hA, and those ranging from 51 to 1000
hA, fall under the Unified Farmers Regime, or RAU. This decrees that a Rural
Property Goods Tax must be paid for the extent of area affected by agricultural
activities - this is paid yearly, to the current sum of 25.5 Bs ($3.69 USD) per hectare.
[107]
However, land ownership sizes less than 50 hA are negated from these charges,
despite still participating within the RAU, and needing to prove status. Elsewise, land
ownerships greater than 1000 hA must instead pay a Value-Added Tax (IVA), which
equates to 13%, “paid for all sales of goods, construction contracts, service contracts
and imports,” and a Transactions Tax (IT), equaling 3% of all transactions occurring
nationally, regarding trade, industry functions, and professional services. [107] The idea
through the separation of tax regimes theoretically benefits the medium and smallscale producers, through negligible taxation rates, and freedom from the Value Added
Tax. And, overall, there is little risk of tax evasion from lands under RAU, but there is
considerable risk from those which exceed 1000 hA; a taxation system based on the
sale of their product, in a largely informal economy, allows for potential and
widespread evasion. [107] Seventy percent of Bolivia's GDP is considered to be
Figure 3: Cattle awaiting auction
6
in Santa Cruz.

informal (economic activities that escape detection through governmental bodies), indicating that there is a significant
potential for taxation avoidance. [7] This is especially important considering that these large landowners are the ones
responsible for the greatest extent of land use and degradation in Bolivia; their actions are a detriment to Bolivian
soils, but without much returned revenue to the internal government. [75] The element of taxation is essential
concerning land use, because it is a system that is relatively inexpensive and loosely enforced, which results in the
continuation of a political model that upholds an economic mechanism that undervalues land deterioration.
Finally, the inclusion of hydrocarbon subsidization is of significant importance. Since the turn of the century, Bolivia
has held the prices of petroleum products at a standstill, primarily to incentivize economic development in the face of
difficulties. And despite the times of economic recession having passed, this subsidization remains in effect, largely
due to public outcry against its reform. This comes at the expense of the internal budget, which often has to import
considerable amounts of petrol and diesel, particularly from Venezuela, and then subsidize it, at a net negative cost.
In 2012, for example, the government's failure to abolish the subsidy cost $755 million USD, an amount that
exceeded “all social program stipends and government pensions combined.” [65][80] Currently, roughly 80% of the
petroleum utilized in Bolivia is nationally produced - the rest is imported. (Field Notes) Prices for diesel, which is primarily
utilized by the agriculture industry, remain fixed at 3.72 Bs per Litre, or $2.04 USD per gallon. (Field Notes) Mechanized
agriculture can be identified as the most financially lucrative of the agrarian industries. However, it is suggested that
these profits could see a reduction of nearly half if the petroleum subsidization is removed. [84] Overwhelmingly, the
dependence on cheapened fuel prices creates a model of social retaliation to change and thus advantageous
utilization by the agriculture sector, which consumes approximately 50% of all available diesel. [123]

Underlying Economic Implications
Much of Bolivian agriculture is actually not produced through Bolivian nationals; there is a heavy presence of
foreigners in the lowlands, particularly Brazilians and Mennonites, as well as those from other Andean countries who
have emigrated to take advantage of cheap lands, labor and exorbitant economic opportunity. This was primarily
inspired through considerably advantageous currency exchange rates, whereby lands purchased in Bolivia, as
compared to the immigrant’s home country, were far cheaper, and the currency carried much greater purchasing
power. Such that the 1990s were a time of structural readjustment and neoliberal freedoms, along with a mass influx
of foreigners beginning to purchase the most valuable and productive lands within the Santa Cruz area, often
outcompeting Bolivian nationals due to sheer investment ability. [123] This divide is critically apparent today, especially
in the cash crop, extractive, export-oriented industries, e.g. soybeans. Although land tenure has radically improved,
there exists no concrete data on ownership nationality; it is nevertheless believed that Brazilians are responsible for
35 - 40% of the total amount - approximating one million hectares - of planted soybeans. [123][84][96] In fact, despite the
progressive changes and improvements under the Movement for Socialism (MAS) administration, only an estimated
43% of total soybean production is in the hands of Bolivian nationals, with the remaining 57% belonging to
foreigners. [89] These huge influxes of international investment capital are promoting mechanized agriculture and
larger scale cattle ranching. Given the distance to the Brazilian border, and the passage agreements between the
two countries, there is evidence to suggest an informal but growing intra-border livestock and agrarian product trade
is occurring. [84] This only goes to speak to the chasmic divide between the people of Bolivia and those that come to
use their lands. Brazil, in particular, utilizes lands in Bolivia as a production extension to fulfil their own needs, but
with much cheaper costs, much less regulation, and reduced repercussion concerning damages and abuses. This
spurs an increasing imbalance of land ownership. Concerning soybean production lands, land owners with 1000 hA
or more represent just 2% of the total farm units, but own over 70% of the land area, while small-scale landowners
with fewer than 50 hA make up roughly 80% of the total farm units, yet own under 10% of these lands. [75][54] Thus,
economic incentives and an attractive purchasing potential ensure that foreigners establish dominant control within
the agrarian industry, specifically through the commoditization of the best, most productive lands, ultimately widening
the gap in power between national and foreign capital.
Furthermore, it is necessary to compare Bolivia to the countries it competes with directly - primarily Brazil, Argentina,
and Paraguay. These countries in many ways mirror the agrarian production of Bolivia, namely through a focus on
livestock, and cash crops such as soybeans and corn. But one of the greatest differences lies in the use of
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genetically modified seeds; Bolivia restricts the use of transgenic
seeds to RR1 & RR2 (Roundup Ready) soybeans and a specific
strain of sorghum, although the latter two were approved in March
of 2019, specifically with the intention of biodiesel developments.
(Field Notes)[89]
Given as the seed market is heavily controlled
(despite leakages and the importation of contraband seeds),
Bolivian production values are vastly less than those of the
neighboring countries; the use of GM seeds can nearly double
the production quantities of a given area. (Field Notes) But more
importantly is the sheer amount of produce; Bolivia is vastly
underwhelmed in comparison to the agrarian productive power of
the neighboring states, particularly concerning agro-feed crops
such as soybean and maize. Likewise, heads of cattle are
dramatically greater in Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay than they
are in Bolivia; the Brazilian cattle industry is roughly 24 times
larger in size than Bolivia’s. [36] Thus, due to the combination of
inferior infrastructure, technological access, limiting legislation,
and market manipulations, in spite of the total land area potential,
Bolivia is consistently at the mercy of foreign markets. So much
so that fluctuations in neighboring countries can cripple specific
internal economies within the agricultural sector, due to a
devaluation of nationally produced goods, leading to a shortage,
and therefore a reliance upon neighboring country importation,
with a sharp increase in the price of these commodities shortly
following. (Field Notes)[77] This has been explicitly and continually
upheld through the need for staple food importations, even to this
Figure 4: Gross Production Value contrasted
between neighboring countries and Bolivia. [36]
day. [76] Despite increasing production, Bolivia is regularly reliant
on the import of foods; 634 million kilograms of food products
were imported in 2017 alone from Argentina, with a subsequent 54 million kilograms from Brazil, the United States,
and Paraguay. [89][55][17] Meaning ultimately that Bolivia, given its comparatively inferior economic clout, is a country
caught between the evils of market control. Initial production quantities and land use areas are relatively
inconspicuous when compared to the neighboring countries - namely Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay - whereby
influences from these countries signifies an unstable dependence for Bolivia upon preferential, conquered agrarian
production markets. [83]
At the heart of the Bolivian agrarian complex is a prolonged doctrine of extractivism, which is based on a
developmental model stemming from the “three-pronged” neoliberal exploitation of hydrocarbons, minerals, and
agricultural production. [75] Extractivism can be defined through a historical lineage, especially in a global context,
firstly instilled through colonial duress and then upheld through ‘post-colonial’ relationships. It also stipulated political
and economic accords which often resembled models of “appropriation and accumulation.” [75][28] Extractivism is
based upon the divide between the developed northern hemisphere, and the developing southern hemisphere,
whereby the North exploits the South through the exportation of raw materials in order to sustain their industrial and
economic advancements, yet at the expense of the other. As such, the root of extractivism is not focused around a
single commodity, but through the dissociated mentality of resource exploitation within one country for the benefit of
another. Rather than inspire agricultural development, which would incentivize value-added processing, dynamic
sectoral interconnections and employment, extractivism is purely focused on exported product, with an explicit
disinterest in the resulting environmental and socioeconomic disparities left in its wake. [75] Large quantities of raw
materials are extricated and then exported, whereby their value is garnered through refinement and production in
another country. The resulting environmental damages are left to be endured, often by those of the poorest, and
least adaptable dispositions. Furthermore, extractivism is encouraged through mechanization, intensification and
specialization, such that it does not require an extensive labor force. This results in a “social and sectoral
disarticulation from the rest of the economy,” effectively meaning that the “capacity to consume is developed
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externally and thus not dependent on a robust internal market or domestic demand.” [75][26] As will be discussed later
under policy influences, extractivism plays a crucial role in Bolivia, especially concerning extirpative land use change,
primarily through the adjunct of neoliberal policies, which saw a deregulation of investment flow, and lackadaisical
labor, territorial, and environmental decrees. [28][76]
Bolivia's ‘new-age’ extractivism, under the current Movement for Socialism (MAS) government, can thusly be seen
through the increased role of the state in these profitable sectors and with the nationalization of specific industries,
market adjustments, governmental-private partnerships, and an increased dependence on taxation and royalties to
offset the mounting damages. [29][46][75] Yet throughout these economic sectors, and particularly in the agriculture
industry, there is a level of social support for the multinational capital that precipitates these industries and with the
mentality that their investments bring wealth and fortune to the country along with contributions to food security.
While this is true, to an extent, it is largely deceptive upon the proportionality of internal versus external revenues.
Bolivia’s own vice president, Álvaro García Linera, is quoted with saying that such a model of development is “the
only technical means [we have] to distribute the material wealth … and to allow us to have the material, technical and
cognitive conditions to transform [our] technical and productive base.” [39] Meaning that Bolivia’s political rhetoric is
embedded in the conviction that resource exploitation and capitalization is the only means of growth and prosperity.
However, this only perpetuates a relationship of dependency, conditioned by the original makings of the colonial era,
whereby the developing and often impoverished southern countries rely on the industries of the north in order to
bring capital and diversified industrial advancements to their countries. With the involvement of the state, this
extractivism is then reframed as a “form of resource nationalism and as a means to regain its sovereignty from
external forces, which have historically exploited the country’s natural resource wealth during the ‘old extractivism’ of
colonial and neoliberal regimes.” [15][39] To the extent that opposition to raw material exploitative intentions is deemed
a form of ‘imperialism,’ through the message that “the governments of rich nations now use environmental concerns
to promote policies that deny underdeveloped nations the right to control and manage their own resources.” [38][15]
This is the root of our current climate paradox: countries such as China and the United States seek these lands to
satisfy their internal demands for, among others, agro-food products and biofuels, thus exacerbating the dependency
and conditionality of extractivism, minority impoverishment, and environmental carnage, all the while harping a
perceived agenda of proactivity and climate-friendliness, without recognizing the connection of cause and effect.
Today, as Asian, European, and American markets begin to run out of arable lands to meet increasing internal
demands, there is a trend towards agricultural production in the rich tropical rainforests of South America, especially
within Brazil, Paraguay, and Bolivia. [78] Such that these countries begin to serve as proxies for the affluent,
developed world, yet at their own peril. Combined with a global trend of increased capital accumulation within private
hands, along with decreases in revenues directed towards state bonds (both consequently occurring through
influences of international financial crises), a trend emerges whereby an increasing amount of private capital is
invested in exploitative trades - particularly agriculture - in developing countries. [84][35] These extractive industries,
usually being capital and technologically intensive, ultimately fail to generate labor opportunities, repelling large
workforces, and creating a partially ‘socially disarticulated economy,’ whereby labor becomes a “surplus in relation to
its utility for capital.” [65][75][115] As such, the nature of the global capitalist market builds upon the lack of technological
access, negotiation influence, and financial power to “ensure that capital, and technology-rich firms almost always
come out on top.” [65][50][100][125][101] But, it's a subtle involvement, one where the majority of the population does not
come to see the parallels between foreign investment and poverty perpetuation - that which is ultimately increasing
the divide between the developed and the developing. Nonetheless, Bolivia's economy is growing at rates nearing
5% under the Morales administration, a number which is nearly double the South American average. [117] Progress is
coming to light, social minorities are earning greater recognition, and economic disparities are far lessened than in
the past. Yet critically, many of these financial advancements are forged at the expense of the local environment and
thus the global climate. The tragedy effectively exists in this separation, such that those with the greatest financial
resources take advantage of an economic frontier in Bolivia, built upon spotty regulation, impartial environmental
decree, and social inequalities, without any conscientiousness to the destructive repercussions. The Bolivian people
both need and deserve these advancements, but they are doing so at a cost that ultimately is detrimental, creating
an impending and evident reality of environmental degradation and natural resource deprivation, all within the context
of a waning globally climatic resilience.

9

Policy
Structural Adjustment and Neoliberal Policy (1986-2006)
It may be prudent to begin in the 1950s, which saw the
beginnings of a National Revolution, in 1952. Prompted in part
by the growing Green Revolution, state and international
development agencies funneled capital into lowland agriculture
in the Department of Santa Cruz. [116] In conjunction, the
Bolivian government encouraged migration and colonization of
the eastern lowlands, particularly for larger scale monocrops,
termed the “March to the East.” [106] These agricultural lands
were intended solely for domestic consumption, in order to
provide food-security, alongside economic advancements. As a
result, the Bolivian lowlands witnessed intense colonization from
the 1950s into the 1970s, primarily because of the migration of
peasant ‘campesinos’ from the highland Andean region. [88] This
was the beginning of widespread land-use change in Bolivia,
creating the foundation for agrarian growth and the subsequent
abuses and oligarchies.

Figure 5: Bolivian Coat of Arms

In the mid-1980s, Bolivia's economy was on the edge of a complete collapse, caused primarily by the downfall of tin
mining, which at the time was the state’s main source of revenue. Under the instruction of the World Bank, Bolivia
embraced sweeping structural reform and neoliberal policy. Termed a “shock treatment,” these adjustment policies
were framed as “market - rather than state - led solutions,” which capitalized on free trade and resource privatization.
[71]
This entailed currency devaluations, export tax nullification, import tax reductions, suppression of price
governance, and road construction. [96] By reducing currency inflation, national deficit, and public spending, and
through improving trade balances, the structural adjustment era was conceived to re-stimulate economic growth and
save a country on the brink of fiscal disaster. [62] While the policies were initially enacted to bring about measures of
economic stabilization in the short term, they also intended to enact a new model of “economic growth and social
redistribution based on free market principles.” [84][81] In the truest sense, it was an adoption of neoliberal market
mechanisms, which heralded the beginnings of domestic market deregulation, trade liberalizations, privatization, and
government and subsidies reductions. [82] These exhaustive structural adjustments began to promote economic
recovery largely through shifts to “non-traditional exports,” such as soybean production and timber harvesting,
beginning an era of increased pressure on the forests of Bolivia. [62] But it worked; these policies were able to pull
Bolivia from the edge of bankruptcy and fuel an unprecedented level of economic growth.
Concerning the agro-industrial production, neoliberal policies concentrated on the removal of barriers of foreign
investment in the hopes of attracting international capital. Until the end of the 1980s, agriculture production and
development had primarily been facilitated by the State, with the intent to achieve national food security, without
concern or potential for export. [84] By institutionalizing currency devaluations, in conjunction with trade incentives and
land market liberalization, the state allowed access to virgin lands by multinational companies and large landowners.
[84]
The resulting reductions in domestic demand for lands were therefore replaced by an inducement of agrarian
production in the lowlands, primarily in the Department of Santa Cruz, by foreign investment, especially those of
neighboring Andean countries. [88] As such, the evidence that structural reform policies were the central proponent of
changing land-use in the lowlands of Bolivia is unmistakable. [96]
These agro-industrial companies, in conjunction with larger-scale Santa Cruz farmers and foreign colonies
(Mennonites and Japanese), spurred a conspicuous increase in deforestation, to facilitate agricultural production. [112]
In the 1990s, the “accrual of foreign exchange through the increase of cash crop production” was the single greatest
driver of deforestation in Bolivia. [96] This was further cemented into social and economic certitude through the World
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Bank and German International Corporation’s (kfW) $56.4 million “Lowlands of the East Project,” which ran from
1990 to 1997, and was implemented to increase export earnings. [84][112] Lands in the Expansion Zones, or east of the
Río Grande, were sold or allocated to agri-businesses and large-scale producers, while credit mechanisms were
implemented in order to incentivize the conversion and industrialization of these lands. [96] Through the purchase of
machinery intended for land clearing and cultivation, along with storage facilities and road developments, along with
cooperation from indigenous organizations, the Eastern Lowlands project stimulated growth from business owners
though the encouragement of frontier development. [84] Price manipulations were also completely eliminated, and
barriers for export trade were withdrawn, in combination with the growth of the Andean Pact, which is now the
Andean Community, and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), with a rationale that competition within
markets, and tariff elimination, promote efficiency between member states. [5][62][96]
Catalyzed by the burgeoning environmental impacts of the new neoliberal market mechanisms, Bolivian policy then
underwent a “second-generation” development period. [84] This new legislation was aimed at addressing the poor
governance of public resources, such as forest management, and land ownership. [116] The Forest Law, No. 1700, of
1996, was one of the first laws passed concerning forest use management, partly in order to bring forestry practices
up to the standards of the UNFCCC, and the Convention to Combat Desertification and Drought. [12] This law
increased the federal authority over the regulation of the forestry industry and economic land use. Its core objective
was to establish a criterion for sustainable use and protection of forests, by connecting social, economic, and
ecological interests. It created the Regimen of National Forests, overseen by a national Forestry Superintendent, and
a National Forest Development Fund, all under the Ministry of Environment and Water (previously called the Ministry
of Sustainable Development and Environment). [12]
The Forest Law was less about sustainable action, as might be ostensibly suggested. It attempted to enforce
property level land-use plans (Plan de Ordenamiento Predial, POP), for any landholding greater than 50 hectares. [83]
Thus, any land clearings done by the landowner would require a POP, and a fee to be paid for deforesting, which
stood at just $15 per hA, until subsequent legislation in 2006. Ultimately, this policy, in combination with Agrarian
Reform Law No. 1715 and Environmental Law No. 1333 (which guaranteed better protection and conservation of the
environment and natural resources, through environmental assessments) [24], resulted in insufficient outcomes in
halting the rise in deforestation, primarily “due to the lack of governance and serious conflicts on land tenure.”
[84][83][86]
However, this was the first major legislation to attempt to mitigate negative effects of greenhouse gases
(GHGs) through conservation efforts within tropical forests, combat desertification, and to preserve natural
environments for future generations. [12] Although an evolving climate was a driver within this law, it was
overwhelmed by the focus concerning land resource conservation efforts. The Law of Mother Earth, Law No. 300
now holds the foremost statutory language surrounding environmental adaptation and harm mitigation within forest
management, but this law still remains in full effect. [66] Furthermore, a new forestry law has not been enacted, largely
resulting from political disarray and conflicting interests surrounding current natural resource management.
Immediately following the Forest Law, the National Agrarian Reform Service Law, No. 1715, (1996) was enacted to
create the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), which is a governmental body that oversees development
and production within Bolivia’s agricultural sector. It was fostered by the need to regularize property rights through
land registration, as well as from the widespread public discontent with the direction and abuses beginning to emerge
from the agrarian revolution. [123][67] Additionally, it promised legitimacy to indigenous land rights, which had never
been properly attenuated. One of the prominent goals of the INRA law was to define property rights, due to the
overlapping and conflicting claims created in the forty years since the National Revolution. However, after ten years
(until the Agrarian Reform Law of 2006), only 45.3% of lands had gone through the permitting and titling process, and
only 30.7% of these lands had been completed. [67] This remains a problem, to this day, as those without definitive
property ownership risk losing the entirety of their landholdings. Although the 2007 Law of Agrarian Reform, No. 3543
now primarily dictates the legal framework surrounding land use in Bolivia, the INRA law still remains in integral
effect. One of the key aspects of this law that retains crucial relevance is the concept of Social Economic Purpose
(Función Economica Social; FES). [67] This is the notion that the right to own lands is based upon its utilization. While
this is assumed for subsistence land holdings, larger landowners must prove this, though departmental and municipal
land use plans (Planes de Uso de Suelo, PLUS). [67][83] In essence, if your lands are not being used in an approved
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manner, they are forfeited and reverted to the State. This is significant, because it deems that land holdings must be
actively managed, with a monetary incentive, which underlyingly suggests the need to deforest one's lands for
agricultural usage.
The neoliberal period in Bolivia represented a time of economic freedom and an open frontier, particularly for capitalintensive land owners and multinationals. It laid the stage for the fundamental mantra of extractivism in Bolivia, while
deepening the divide between the elite and the smallholder land owners, particularly the indigenous. Until 2006,
Bolivian economics was characterized by the marginalization of the minorities through the profits of the prosperous.
Even to this day, despite smaller subsequent amendments, the Forest Law, No.1700 still favors large-scale land
owners and capital-intensive enterprises, based on the principles of commoditization, while ignoring more
“comprehensive forms of forest use,” either by local communities or business interests. [15] And the many infractions
of the neoliberal era came to a head with the election of Evo Morales, when the country’s indigenous and campesino
workers rose together in anger against the injustices and abuses imparted from the lineage of the Bolivian
Government. Yet, even despite the drastic changes ushered into effect in 2006, the basis of extractive profiteering
had been sown, particularly in the agriculture and hydrocarbon industries, pullulating within Bolivian policy and
economic proceedings.

Figure 6: Land clearing still requires proof of a socioeconomic function, which indirectly encourages deforestation.
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Post-Neoliberal Reform and the MAS (2006-)
Basing its principles in harsh contrast with the neoliberal development policies enacted for the last twenty years, the
Movement for Socialism (MAS) party of Evo Morales was elected with sweeping approval in 2006. [84] Championing
an idea of “Living Well,” the government under MAS aimed to reshape the unequal disparities in the internal
‘production matrix,’ by promoting a more plural economy, with increased State influence within development and
production of vital, economically stimulating sectors. [42][84] Morales came to power through social minority population
support and on the promise of transforming the country though the use of natural resource wealth. This involved
fiscal budget appropriation to programs that advanced, among others, poverty reduction, health care and education,
transportation and infrastructure improvements, and industrialization and opportunity developments. [65] And, despite
political turmoil, these changes were ratified in 2009, with the Political Constitution of the State (CPE), marking a new
era in economic, social, and political reform. It stressed, among other aspects, the natural resource ownership of the
Bolivian people, with management by the State; a transformation of social, civil, political, and economic rights of the
country's citizens; and a revolution in the legal, social, fiscal, and political plurality of the Bolivian State. [31] This new
economic resolution, dubbed the “national production model,” entailed five pillars, calling for government expansion,
production improvements, public participation, domestic market security, and wealth redistribution, with a reduction of
inequalities. [42][31][84] In effect, the State began to have a much more aggressive role in national markets, in order to
give priority production to internal demands and uncouple the divide between multinational interests and those in
poverty, which became particularly evident in the agricultural sector.
This was of exceptional social importance concerning the country's hydrocarbons, which had been under exhaustive
control by international extractive businesses. On May 1st, 2006, President Morales stood before the San Alberto
gas fields, surrounded by supporters and soldiers, and called for the nationalization of hydrocarbons, asserting his
administration's legitimacy, by “vindicating the historic defense and commitment to industrialize natural resources.”
[65][45][113]
“The return of our hydrocarbon wealth to the hands of the nation, which will be used to benefit the country,”
as written into the ‘Presidential Decree for the Nationalization of Hydrocarbons, Heroes of the Chaco,’ had long been
a rallying point of deeply national importance. [41] So much so, in fact, that shortly after Morales proclaimed “property
of all Bolivians,” his approval rating rose to 81%. [45][126] This validated how intrinsically linked the control of natural
resources are to the nationalistic sense of dignity and sovereignty. [79] This was legislated through significant royalty
increases, along with the demand for international businesses to surrender all production to the state energy
company, the YPBF, in exchange for an adjusted service fee. [118] And this reclamation by the MAS yielded dramatic
changes for the national revenue; increasing from $173 Million USD in 2002, to $2.2 Billion in 2011. [127] This is
particularly relevant given how interwoven the hydrocarbons of Bolivia are with the social and economic fabrics of the
country. Especially for the agro-industrial sector, which consumes half of all domestic diesel. [123] In effect, through
the return of hydrocarbons to State control, the MAS promoted an economic model that was widely believed to be
effective in stimulating fiscal growth across the entire country, especially for the impoverished and forgotten. The
fundamental assumption was therefore one that resource extraction would transform Bolivia, as impressed upon by
the MAS, into an “Andean Socialist” economy; one that was integrated and modern, but which also respected the
Pachamama (Mother Earth). [65]
President Morales substantiated the beginning of a new Agrarian Revolution, in June of 2006, by granting 60
indigenous communities in the Santa Cruz lowlands with communal land titles (Tierras Comunitarias de Origen,
TCO), which amounted to over 7.5 Million hA. [33] Given that land tenure was one of the key pillars of Morales’
campaign, Law No. 3543 of Communitarian Re-organization of the Agrarian Reform Law (2007) was one of the first
major articles of legislation enacted. It amends the National Agrarian Reform Service Law, No. 1715, of 1996, leaving
it largely unchanged, except for drastic changes to State held lands, which were to be redistributed to indigenous and
peasant communities on a basis of need. [68] Through this, the objective of ensuring that all privately held lands
served a “socio-economic function” (FES), as originally written in Law No. 1715, was upheld. Concerning agricultural
and livestock use, the easiest way to demonstrate this land-ownership justification was through deforestation. [84] As
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such, given the accelerated land regularization from the MAS
government, FES compliance largely manifested an increase in
deforestation, in combination with a Plot Management Plan (POP) to
legalize such clearing. [88][74] Elsewise, this law served to redefine the
authority of the INRA, which lacked legitimacy until this reform, by
expanding powers surrounding agrarian structure transformation and
increasing transparency. [56] But, most importantly, despite the positive
progress surrounding legal land tenure, in conjunction with the
recognition of indigenous rights, the Agrarian Reform Law ultimately
failed to undo the injustices of the agrarian extractivism complex, which
continues to “exclude and marginalize the majority of the population,
most particularly small-scale and peasant farmers.” [23][77]
Considering the influence structural reform in Bolivia has had on
ecosystem services, the MAS administration was faced with the
enormous task of legitimizing a long history of forest abuses. But this
inherently meant that their actions were more so in validating these
industries, thus generating internal tax revenue, than through instilling a
prohibition on them, despite the superficial language pushing sustainable
morals. As such, the Supreme Decree, No. 0443, of 2010 heralded
movement towards progressive forest use, most notably through the
creation of the National Program of Forestation and Reforestation. [37]
This effectively meant a mandatory compliance with new forest use
regulations, such as through the municipal government registration, ABT
(The Regulatory Agency for the Social Control of Forests and Lands)
operation registration, proof of business lawfulness through tax payment,
and a General Forest Management Plan (PGMF) and Forestry Operative
Annual Plan (POAF) through the ABT. [37] In contrast, indigenous
communities were granted the forests on their land for their use and
management with relatively lax stipulations, with the ruling that other
timber and non-timber concessions must not conflict with these holdings.
[37]
But those guidelines have been consistently breached, as the
government then continued permissions that overlapped these rights,
despite being in full compliance with extractive requirements. [83] As
such, this decree gave much more enforceable, discretionary power to
the ABT, but ultimately had a null effect in requiring effective decreases
in forest misappropriations and exploitations, particularly through an
imbalanced abuse of authority.
In 2011, Law 144 for a Productive Revolution was decreed chiefly to
obtain food sovereignty, through the “institutional, political, technical, and
financial capacity for increased production, transformation, and
commercialization of agricultural and forestry products” (Article 2, Law
144). [76] In contrast with optimistically sustainable language concerning
organic productions, communitarianism, the recovery of soils and use of
native seeds, and a respect for the Pachamama of ‘good living,’ the law
actually concerns the production, importation, and commoditization of
genetically modified foods. [76][11] But this legislation begins to reveal an
interesting divide from the agrarian reform movement earlier on in the
MAS administration, with the former attempting to re-appropriate lands to
the marginalized and upset the deep-rooted exploitations of the
neoliberal era. However, the productive revolution was more focused on
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Figure 7: Forest clearing in Chuquisaca, usually
done by hand.

food security and sovereignty, given the increasing reliance on staple imports. It was therefore becoming apparent
that the policies of the 20th century had instilled an economic system which had no empathy for inequality or food
security. As such, the productive revolution was less concerned with the imbalances of land usage, titling, and
poverty reduction, but was instead a reactionary attempt to curtail an increasingly dire reliance on neighboring
countries to feed the national population, ironically furthering the hold of the capital-intensive, export intended
Bolivian agro-industry.
One of the most environmentally inclusive laws was written in 2010 with the establishment of The Rights of Mother
Earth, Law No. 071. This legislation was the foundation preceding the much more extensive Mother Earth Law in
2012. The law’s singular focus was to recognize ‘Mother Nature’ as a political subject, essentially giving her the rights
of life, water, biodiversity, clean air, restoration, equilibrium and a life free of contamination. The law codifies that it is
the obligation of the government and the citizens to defend and protect the rights of ‘Mother Earth.’ [12] Following suit
in 2012, The Mother Earth Law and Integral Development to Live Well, Law No. 300, is considered one of the most
exhaustive and comprehensive decrees pertaining to sustainable development in Bolivia. It focuses on Bolivia’s
claimed dedication to respecting the balance between the natural world and human life, while also prioritizing
knowledge and rights of the country's indigenous population. The central focus of the legislation is to “establish the
vision and fundamentals of integral development in harmony and balance with Mother Earth to Live Well,
guaranteeing the continued capacity of Mother Earth to regenerate natural systems, recuperating and strengthening
local and ancestral practices, within the framework of rights, obligations and responsibilities.” [93]
Within the context of climate change, this law outlines the many provisions contrasted between conservationist and
extractive agendas. It expresses the concept of ‘climate justice,’ written into the language, rights, and responsibility of
all Bolivian citizens to ‘Live Well,’ especially concerning those most adversely vulnerable to a changing climate. It
dignifies the viewpoint that some states - and nations - have more of a global responsibility to respond to climate
change than do others. Through key avenues of action, the law focuses on reducing the climatic risks posed, while
also encouraging sustainable development of natural resources, inscribed through the following: [12]
●
●
●
●
●
●

Permanent incorporation and prevention of resource management to respond to natural disasters, through the
‘System of Integral Planning.’
Risk assessment and mitigation within the agriculture sector to prevent food insecurity and reduced crop yield.
Strengthening of territorial management processes of local authorities in order to persuade risk management
and adaptation integration into climate change action.
Adoption of risk management protocol surrounding natural disasters, including adaptation to climate change
across state development projects, which includes informational channels to issue warning in times of crisis.
Integrated planning to assist the agriculture sector and indigenous communities in accordance with climate
conditions.
Collaboration between private and public scientific research institutions in order to share knowledge and
coordinate research concerning vulnerabilities relating to the climate.

This law also introduced the Joint Mitigation and Adaptation Mechanism for the Integrated and Sustainable
Management of Forests and Mother Earth, which was later decreed (No. 1619) in 2013. [93][116] Bolivia was initially a
supporter of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), but this position has radically
changed with the MAS agenda. The government now stands staunchly against the marketization of nature, instead
seeking mechanisms that are not market based, on the basis that climate justice is essentially in the hands of the
historically responsible. [84] The Joint Mitigation and Adaptation Mechanism decree “seeks to ensure sustainable
forest management through the knowledge and rights of indigenous people and to become an alternative to
dominant market-based mechanisms,” such as REDD, the +/++ renditions, and forest carbon stocks. [84][116] The
effectiveness of this framework has been difficult to judge, particularly because it does not commit to any specific
policy objectives concerning the environment or climate change; the language largely reflects the notion of a false
commitment though ineffective direction concerning action and enforcement. [84] In comparison, other policies
promoting economic growth through measures such as investment, infrastructure, and agricultural expansion, have
had much clearer objectives and incentives.
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Furthermore, The Mother Earth Law and Integral Development to Live Well Law created the Plurinational Authority of
Mother Earth, within the Ministry of Environment and Water, as the representative body tasked with the coordination,
development, and oversight of research, projects, and programs relating to climate change, as well as the
Plurinational Plan and monitoring of greenhouse gas emissions. [84][93] This also included the establishment of the
Plurinational Fund of Mother Earth. Yet, these efforts have largely been considered to be inadequate because they
do not reverse or supersede statutory language that encourages economic forces which place increased pressures
on forests, as well as overarchingly possessing a weak ability to implement regulation across different levels of public
institution. [84] In effect, it defines a framework, but does not provide the capacity needed to conduct action, primarily
through administrative and social coordination.
Then, in 2013, in almost ironic contrast to the Mother Earth Law, the Law of Support to Food Production and Forest
Restitution, No. 337, was passed. Given that it was nearly impossible for the state to penalize infractions to the
previous forest sustainability laws, materialized through illegal deforestation, this legislation legalized all illegal lands
cleared between 1996 and 2011. This was done in order to provide food security, through the commitment to a food
production program and a guarantee to reforest 10% of the cleared lands. [84] For properties larger than 50hA, a fine
of roughly $60 USD was set per hectare of illegally cleared forest. [84] At its core, Law 337 acknowledged that the
forestry laws had been largely unenforced and incompetent, and effectively nullified all infringements over the
previous fifteen years. This was because more than 80% of deforestation and logging taking place up until 2012 was
illegal, which did not contribute any tax revenue to the government, thus causing considerable harm to the
surrounding environments and indigenous communities, in part due to encroachments from settlers. [6][98] The ABT
estimates that from 1996 to 2009, this amounted to the total of 3.3 million hectares being lost to illegal deforestation.
[2][123]
Yet, instead of these lands reverting back to the State, which would have resulted in a slew of legal turmoil
surrounding land tenure, these lands were instead legitimized, in an attempt to stabilize food production and reduce
foreign staple crop dependence. Overall, however, this law was “generally perceived as an instrument to facilitate the
expansion of the agricultural frontier,” despite commitments to reforestation and ecological restoration, because it
legalized over a decade of unlawful land degradation, in the interests of production and food sovereignty. [84][37]
Prompted by a sharp increase in natural disasters, such as flooding and drought, Law No. 602 of Risks Management
was passed. In 2014, prior to the passing of this law, flooding displaced some 24,036 families, destroyed 713 homes,
and killed 44 people. [75][8] This legislation focuses on prevention and resilience by establishing a protocol response
system for dealing with natural disasters. It recognizes climate change within the comprehensive language by
referencing measures that aim to address and adapt to the conditions surrounding climate change. This law created
the National Advisory for the Reduction of Risks and Attention to Disasters, through provincial and municipal
authorities, on top of the national government. It allows local and regional public administrations to declare a state of
emergency, without federal approval. Furthermore, it hands off the responsibility to local governments to implement
climate and natural disaster resiliency plans, hopefully before their likely occurrence. This legislation created an initial
fund of 0.15% of the national budget (~80M BOB, 11.6M USD), to be utilized to fund aid and humanitarian projects in
the aftermath of a disaster. [12] But, despite seeming like a singular act of legislation concerning catastrophe
management, it should be noted that many of these resulting disasters, particularly flooding, could indirectly be
contributed to the influence of widespread deforestation.
Finally, it is worth mentioning current legislation in congruence with international efforts. The Bolivian Intended
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), which was submitted for the 2015 Conference of Parties (COP) 21 meeting
in Paris, is a 17-page document outlining the strategies and adaptations necessary for Bolivia to participate within global
climate change mitigation. In accordance with the Paris Accords, it was ratified on October 5th, 2016. Bolivia has been
historically defensive concerning international bipartisanship, which was seen at the COP 15, in Copenhagen, where
Bolivia’s mission was less of compromise, and more of agitation and blame. But their INDC for 2015 was framed with a
much more cooperative agenda, despite the citation of certain prevailing injustices. The report outlined ten structural
solutions to address the climate crisis: [92]
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Adoption of a new world
order, free of the evils of
consumerism, mercantilism,
and war-mongering; a new
model for civilization without
capitalism. To build a world
order of ‘Living Well,’ that
promotes and defends the
rights and the people, while
unifying nature and society.
2. Construction of a system
based on responsibility to
‘Mother Earth,’ wherein the
culture of life and humanity are
humanized, in that holistic
development aligns with the
values and needs of the
Figure 8: “Integrated and sustainable management of forests and agriculture
environment, “surpassing the
systems life with impacts mitigation and adaptation to climate change.” [92]
simplest approach to
decarbonization of the
economy.” [92]
3. Protection of the ‘Rights of Mother Earth,’ in a concise and complementary manner to the rights of the people,
and their development.
4. Defense of universal common goods, such as shared water and atmosphere, as well as the ‘technological
monopoly,’ which promotes access to the ‘common heritage.’
5. Elimination of patents concerning technologies, and recognition for the intrinsic right of sciences and
technological information within life.
6. Implementation to effectively govern the human right to water.
7. Creation of the ‘International Court of Justice Climate and Mother Earth’ to enable countries to fulfil, and stand
by their commitments to, climate change. [Essentially a court of law penalizing any deviation or negligence from
climate policy commitments.]
8. Allocation for the redistribution of resources from the “military machinery of the imperial powers and warmongers,” in order to finance the actions of those against climate change. [92]
9. Eradication of the commodification of nature, such as carbon markets, that promote wealth inequality from the
sufferings of a changing climate, and are of little effect.
10. Abolishment of the colonial biased views of natural resource management, which see the people of the South
1.

[America] as ‘forest rangers’ for Northern countries, and as enemies of nature.
Their climate action further establishes numerous objectives surrounding natural resource policy and humanitarian
efforts, which are divided into frameworks focused on water, energy, and forest & agriculture. They aim to increase
the adaptive capacity and hydric vulnerability concerning water within their country by a six-fold increase in water
storage capacity by 2030, from 596 million m3 in 2010, to 3,779 million m3. [92] This includes 100% access to drinking
water by 2025, with resilient delivery services and systems. Concerning renewable energies, the document outlines
“increased participation of renewable energy to 79% by 2030, from 39% in 2010, and a further 9% from alternate
energies.” [92] Within the forestry sector, which is arguably the most essential focus of Bolivian climate action, a
complete eradication of illegal deforestation is set to be achieved by 2020, while increasing the “surface of forested
and reforested areas to 4.5 million hectares by 2030.” [92] This also includes strengthening of environmental
functions, through implementation of carbon capture and storage, biodiversity conservation and water availability,
and organic matter and soil fertility to roughly 29 million hectares by 2030.
It is critical to note that the Bolivian manifesto concerning present and projected climate action is far more focusoriented towards humanitarian goals and welfare increases, rather than international cooperation and emissions
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reduction. Throughout their protocols are references to Unsatisfied Base Needs (UBN), centered around raising the
most economically strained out of conditions of hardship. This includes reducing moderate poverty to 13.4% by 2030,
and eradicating extreme poverty by 2025, in accordance with impact, energy generation and coverage, and growth,
distribution, and redistribution of energy income. [92] This is overseen by a growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
to 5.4% by 2030, largely from the energy sector. When reviewed by the VTT Technological Research Centre of
Finland, they stated that “an explicit headline target is missing, and the INDC focuses on planned mitigation actions,
[...] but does not quantify an emission level that would be reached with the planned measures.” [119] Overwhelmingly,
it is stated that the Plurinational State of Bolivia is considerably more concerned about the economic and humanistic
challenges facing their country than they are by their direct and indirect GHG emissions.
It might be argued that the quintessential take away from Bolivian legislation is one of conflict. Many of these
aforementioned laws are in discord with each other; laws of sovereign production are writ in disagreement with those
of sustainable forest management, and any meaningful climatic action is therefore undercut by the greater incentive
to clear lands and perpetuate an extractive model of production. “The lack of governance, land tenure conflicts, and
conceptual gaps limit the application of laws and regulations regarding deforestation,” especially in relation to
deforestation. [116] The government's agenda has long been that of food production and exportation, despite the
direct contradiction with environmental regulation and law. Even now, with the “13 Pillars of the Patriotic Agenda
2025,” the government is championing an agenda to increase agricultural lands from 3 million hA, in 2013, to 13
million hA, in 2025. [13][22][51][54] This is even apparent in the further construction of roads, which result in a greater
access to markets, and oil exploration, especially in protected and indigenous territories. [116][22][60] Hence, there has
been futile progress made toward the adoption and implementation of legislation that is of merit. Overwhelmingly
there is a combative nature to remedy the market mechanisms currently in place, which continue to devalue the need
for ecological preservation, despite a legal framework, such as The Mother Earth Law and Integral Development to
Live Well Law, which preaches progressive and innovative action. [84][83][86] Insufficient enforcement, in parallel with a
history of legal laxness, ensures that the tropical forests and their ecosystem services remain at great risk, and that
the resulting social and environmental impacts from deforestation remain prevalent. [116]

Figure 9: South to San Jose de Chiquitos; near one of the many deforestation frontiers.
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Climate
Circumstances Attributable to Deforestation
The context of deforestation can never truthfully
be attributed to a single cause; rather it is a web
of area-specific, multi-causal driving forces.
Bolivia is of little exception, in that it is a country
unique given its specific motivators, influences,
and perpetrators, but with a story that is no
different from the global narrative surrounding
tropical deforestation. Many of the global
deforestation lineages were first imparted through
the legacies of colonialism, whereby the systems
implemented to extract specific resources left
gaping wounds, and many times upheld endemic
poverties. Yet, the underlying forces, that being
the economic, political, and social institutions
created, remain the chief culprit, usually through
the execution of a model that excludes and
underwhelms ecological damages in relation to
Figure 10: Bolivian forest biomes, with a decreased trend in
gross production. Deforestation, and thus the
precipitation progressing southwards. [84]
entirety of resulting climatic impacts, are grounded
on local, national, and international scales, each
interrelated with the others. More so, “processes and patterns of deforestation are related to specific underlying
causes, proximate causes, and agents,” those of which are varied across landscapes, ecological settings, and
economic and political circumstances. [83][87][44] In Bolivia, the combination of aforementioned political incentives, with
the resulting economic freedoms, helped to ensure that the virgin forests were considered in light of development
and growth, without consideration to underlying repercussions. Only some thirty years later are the environmental
damages beginning to bear their extensive and ugly truths. In the recent history of Bolivia, the policy and market
mechanisms helped create what has been aptly termed a ‘perfect storm’ for deforestation. [96][112]
Today, Bolivia ranks 7th in the world in terms of tropical forest extent, covering 54.7 million hectares (as of 2015),
and contains some of the highest terrestrial biodiversity in the world. [6][9][35] Half of all Bolivia is covered in forests,
predominantly located in the lowlands, and compose seven distinct biomes types, from rainforest to the dry ‘Chaco’
forests. [35][1][105] Yet deforestation rates have risen rapidly within the last three decades, with an average of 300,000
hA of forest lost annually - with some years reaching 430,000 hA - roughly equating to a median 0.5% loss. [6][1][84] In
1990, forest cover exceeded 62.5 million hA, signaling an estimated loss of 7.8 million hA since, roughly 12.5%
[87.5% remaining] of the original cover, as of 2015. Bolivia remains ranked amongst the highest net annual
deforesters worldwide. [9][35] And much of this historically has been illegal; the ABT estimates that from 1996 (Forest
Law, 1715) to 2010, over 3.3 million hectares of forests were illegally cleared. [123] As will be discussed later, these
forests are predominantly cleared using slash-and-burn techniques, whereby the forests are felled using either
machinery or manual labor, with the resulting mass being burned. Most of these forests are cleared explicitly for
utilization of the lands, not for their timber values; it is believed that most of the valuable timber species were already
depleted. [109] The United Nations reports that, over the past thirty years, Bolivia has “one of the highest rates of
deforestation per capita in the world,” at 320m2/person/year - twenty times greater than the global average, at
16m2/person/year. [75][122] Over 75% of this deforestation takes place in the Department of Santa Cruz, which is the
hub of agrarian production in Bolivia, both for mechanized agriculture and ranching operations. [75]
Deforestation rapidly accelerated in the 1990s due to neoliberal structural adjustment policies that, amongst other
changes, largely incentivized large-scale forest clearing for the production of soybeans. [62] For Bolivia, this new,
induced “context of globalization, structural adjustment, regional integration and rapid technological change” was the
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first economic growth that came directly at the expense of the forest ecosystems. [48] This was mainly through new,
preferential market access, specifically from the Andean Pact, which opened up trade with neighboring countries. [88]
Thus came an “expansion of the agricultural frontier at rates of growth never before experienced in Bolivia,” with
much of this growth relying directly on soybean production. [88] Essentially, it was the beginning of Bolivian
exportation, and an involvement with global markets, and the increasing stresses from agricultural commodities within an intercontinental trade network - which posed concerning land-use change and deforestation. [49] The
expanse of the agriculture sector, and the resulting upsurge in deforestation, can be identified through three direct
drivers: the expansion of mechanized farming, cattle ranching, and small-scale, subsistence agriculture. [84]
Mechanized cultivation was identified as the leading cause in deforestation, until the turn of the century, when
livestock production began to increase, heralding significant expansions along the frontier areas. Cattle ranching
generally does not require as healthy of soils, or as much mechanization, thus ranching operations can unfold
relatively easily from newly cleared lands. It is also more space consumptive; cattle rearing requires more space for
the same amount of produce when compared to cereal crops. [84] In fact, since the turn of the century, it is believed
that the principle drivers of deforestation have reversed, with cattle production now being responsible for an
estimated 60% of deforestation; mechanized agriculture slowing to 25%, and small-scale agriculture remained
around 15%. [75][84] As land prices rise, given proximity to infrastructure, and market forces make mechanized ‘cashcrop’ production more profitable, “agro-industry tends to push cattle ranchers to expand into new areas, triggering
more deforestation and opening new areas for future expansion.” [87][48][114] But cattle ranching is, in effect, more of a
nationally accessible trade; international capital can afford the most productive and fertile lands, but indirect policy
and economic incentives, population growth, and social customs helps facilitate the boom in livestock production,
which is almost entirely for the Bolivian market. Thus, both internal and international demands are equally and
opposingly driving elements of land-use change and clearing, but agricultural production as a whole is indicated as
the central catalyst of deforestation in Bolivia. [123] Otherwise, oil and gas exploration, logging, mining, and
hydroelectric developments are cited as shoulder causes to deforestation. [84]
Underneath the proximate drivers of deforestation are indirect causations; influences which aid in the propagation
and reinforcement of practices and mentalities that propone for deforestation and land-use degradation. These can
be demographic, institutional, economic, technological, or cultural; any agent that has leveraging force concerning
forest utilization. [84] Foremostly, deforestation dynamics in Bolivia are significantly affected by demographics;
population disbursement throughout the lowlands, and the infrastructural access to those forests. This has been
impacted by lowland migration, especially from the Altiplano highlands of neighboring foreign countries,
predominantly due to a shifting economy and subsistence needs. Santa Cruz is amongst the fastest growing cities in
the world, primarily due to the impact of rural to urban migration by many nationals seeking work. [118] With this
comes increasing market pressure, and as such, a growing dependence on the surrounding forested lands. This
feeds into the global picture, with international demands continuing to rise, and greater pressures being placed upon
proxy countries that produce staple crops or products. In combination with international capital-seeking investment
opportunities, this encourages mechanization, specialization, and privatization, all of which may be economically
beneficial, but which come at the end cost of the lands upon which these operations are implemented. As well, given
the progressions made under the Movement for Socialism (MAS) administration, domestic markets are flourishing,
largely due to an increasing median income level with many moving away from agricultural livelihoods but becoming
increasingly dependent on agrarian products. And market forces are traced back to policy implementation; tax
incentives and diesel subsidization boost agricultural investments, as well as foreign intervention because of a
deregulated market. [84] This is shown through infrastructure development - particularly road networks - which has an
indirectly poignant relation to deforestation through the creation of easily accessible lands. As well, “perverse [policy]
incentives” facilitate a need to utilize these lands for a ‘socio-economic’ function. [84][44] Elsewise, the advent of
technological advancements, mostly seen through crop mechanization, boosts efficiency, yields, and profits, all the
while increasing strain on land and soil. And while it may be very loosely interrelated, accumulation and privatization
through advantageous market mechanisms also has a net-negative effect concerning forest health as profits largely
encourage expansion. Finally, Bolivia is a country historically rooted in a majority of the population working in land
cultivation and farming activities; there exists no widespread knowledge or understanding concerning the holistic
impacts of forest clearing, soil degradation, or tropical ecosystem vulnerability when compared to site-specific
burdens. [44] This is joined with the attractiveness of the ‘rancher’ social status, ultimately giving a dissenting cultural
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air that is remissive of any consequences associated with land-use change and
deforestation. Meaning that, at no fault of their own, the Bolivian individual working
within the agrarian industry is neither aware nor in contact with information, either
social or official, that discusses such drawbacks concerning deforestation.
Yet this presents a paradox of sorts, in that in an industry saturated with foreign
participation and investment, the Bolivian producer will be influenced by outside
opinion. It is not in any land-owner’s best interest to understand the significance of
forest clearing. Nor is it likely that morals will stand in the way of an economically
profitable frontier. This is likely why, despite farms and ranches of all sizes,
“deforestation is partly due to production in large farms belonging to few farmers.”
[84]
Essentially, those with the most resources have the ability to do the most
damage. Policies favoring large-scale producers cause production, and the
resulting benefits, to become concentrated in the hands of a few hundred farmers.
As an example, in the soy industry, 70% of the lands, or roughly 700,000 hA, is
controlled by just 300 farm units, many of which are Brazilian-owned, representing
2% of the total farm unit ownership. [96][107] Moreover, Article 315 of the new Political
Constitution of the State declares that no single land ownership can exceed 5,000
hA, a barrier easily circumnavigated by registering lands to different family
members. [123][76] In the Department of Pando, it is estimated that 50% of all the
cattle belongs to just twenty families as- most large-scale ranches are managed by
“traditionally wealthy families, with access to extensive land areas,” and capital,
oftentimes internationally sourced. [83][112] This is especially present near the
Brazilian border. Alongside foreign investment ventures, Mennonite colonies
(originating from Canada, Mexico, and Germany, among other countries) are
identified as a primary driver of deforestation in the Bolivian lowlands due to their
destructive practices. [84] Given their often extreme religious views, these colonies
are heavily isolated from outside involvement and previously were relatively
unregulated; they would illegally clear lands, without leaving cortinas - or wind
barriers - and use the lands until exhaustion, then moving on to new, virgin lands.
[96]
And lastly, although being relatively inconsequential, there has been an uptick in
deforestation due to indigenous campesinos, particularly Quechuan and Aymaran,
both having migrated to the lowlands resulting from political impetus. Under the
minority progressions made by the MAS administration (lead by the indigenous
president, Evo Morales), large expanses of lands and forests were titled in favor of
indigenous empowerment, with regulative leeway concerning clearing, in order to
promote native economic growth in competition with lowland commercial interests.
Lands in Bolivia follow a relative pathway of uses and changes, patterns that are
often common in land-abundant tropical countries. [1] Beginning with variations of
slash-and-burn clearing, lands are firstly cleaned, often by larger operations, and
then prepared for farmed or agro-pastoral use. After a variable amount of time,
these lands reach soil exhaustion, either through nutrient depletion from insufficient
crop rotation, or soil compaction from improper cattle grazing techniques. They may
also become infested with weeds, since many shrubs and thorny bushes grow at
such a rate that the only way to stop complete takeover is through heavy herbicides
use. Either way, there is a trend of land abandonment, be it because of exorbitant
financial costs or increasing debt, where once cultivable lands are discarded out of
necessity or financial benefit. Sometimes this is even simply due to a single poor
production year. Thus, the final phase of the lands see a regrowth of secondary
vegetation, usually in the form of homogenous thorny shrubbery, which is nearly as
Figure 11: USGS satellite imaging showing deforestation in the department of Santa Cruz, Bolivia.
[1975, 1986, 1995, 2005, 2017]

21

intensive to remove as untouched forests. [1] Only the larger, industrialized operations can fend off soil expenditure,
which is usually in the form of synthetic N-fertilizers. [121] This inefficient cycling and abandonment comes at a cost ecologically, but also economically - as increases in deforestation are not congruent with improvements in GDP. [1]
Regulation surrounding deforestation is notoriously difficult because it requires nearly complete spatial adherence,
since increased deforestation without dynamic applicability is likely to create “negative spillovers in the form of
leakage of agricultural activities and deforestation to less-regulated areas, and/or a redistribution of non-compliant
product sales to non-participants.” [94][70] Concerning conservation actions, these would undercut any carbon storage
or biodiversity benefits. [69] In order for regulation to be effective in localized forest conservation, it must reduce
deforestation beyond the scope of a specific area so that implementation also occurs beyond the scope of where
transgression is likely to transpire and in order to act in the absence of intervention. [61] Essentially, a policy is only
likely to be effective in meeting conservation goals when the penalizations from noncompliance exceed the cost of
adherence, or conversely when incentives for compliance exceed the benefits of negligence. [59] One of the most
immediate results of regulative policy is intensification; when expansion is limited, producers look to maximizing
output within a given land area. While intensification usually produces a generally positive outcome, it can come with
its own faults, such as increased land prices, land accumulation by the more affluent, mechanization, potential
overuse, and subsequent land degradation. Results demonstrate that policy measurements in Bolivia have only
limited success, “largely because regulatory mechanisms lack economic incentives.” [63] As discussed, current
policies surrounding deforestation management in Bolivia, within a climatic context, are woefully lacking and are
without progressive, interrelated control. Future legislation will need to capitalize on the imperative of ceasing
leakage across all spectrums.
The future of Bolivian deforestation is tightly interwoven with the progressions of markets and policy, both directly
and indirectly. Expanded market access in particular, such as through the exportation of beef, would have harrowing
consequences concerning the future of Bolivian forests. Similarly, the “13 Pillars of the Patriotic Agenda 2025”
proposal, if seen to fruition, would herald a boom of agrarian growth with not an afterthought to the destruction of the
remaining forest lands. [13] The spatial distribution of land-use change is already strongly interrelated to road
connectivity; despite the social advancements, infrastructure modernization shows little benefit for the health and
longevity of these ecosystems. [116] This in conjunction with an upward trend in urbanization, and the resulting
changes in consumption patterns and demands for agricultural products, substantiate only an increased reliance
upon Bolivia’s forested lands. [25] Agricultural expansion undoubtedly plays a crucial role concerning food sovereignty
and poverty reduction, but as Bolivia further develops, the fate of these forests become increasingly uncertain. Given
the current, and increasing, rates of deforestation, without significant market or political changes, Bolivia could more
than easily double their already deforested area by 2050. And this comes with grave realities concerning the global
carbon budget, and the imperative role forest systems have within any meaningful action towards emissions
reductions.

Figure 12: A cortina that was burned due to nearby desmonte fires growing out of control.
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Climatic Inputs
The interrelations and progressions of policy, market mechanisms, and social structures all come to a mutual
coalescence, based on the natural environments in which these institutions grow and prosper; the three-legged
societal structure is based upon the ground on which it stands. This is the irony of our climate crisis: our species
explicitly depends upon the lands and resources provided to us by this planet, but in doing so fails to incorporate their
destruction into any of the systems that propagate financial and social advancements. These are systemic failures,
whereby extractive mechanisms assume the ecosystems in which they operate are infinite and unchanging. In this
moral conundrum we are bound; our industries, civil foundations, and communal interconnectedness are all based
upon the prosperity attenuated by the resources pried from this Earth, such that our continued abuses and misuses
ultimately incite our own depravations. The stories in Bolivia are no different. The forest systems and mineral
resources upon which the people depend have allowed innumerable humanistic progressions, yet these finite
resources each speak to a greater whole, concerning the overarching balances of the planet. Is it not a ruthless
paradox that the natural reserves in Bolivia might allow an unparalleled level of growth, but one, in the end, at the
people's expense? It might therefore be argued that Bolivia’s current predicament is one of uncertainty: global
climatic effects are already beginning to ravage these delicate tropical lands, but their economies have finally
reached a maturation that has never been before seen, carrying with it a spread of welfare and common prosperity.
Which, then, becomes more necessary to address; what matters more to the collective human psyche? With a
history of deprivation and neglect, the Bolivian people have seized upon the opportunities of development, even if it
is at the direct expense of their environments, health, and global climatic equilibriums.
Concerning the agrarian industry, and their affiliate commercial exploits, this comes at the expense of the farreaching forests of Bolivia. Tropical forests, and especially those in Bolivia, constitute a key resource for a successful
global strategy, not only to mitigate, but also to adapt to the consequences of climate change.” [83][35] The remaining
virgin lands of South America play a decisive role in the preservation of ecosystem services, such as biodiversity
sustentation, hydrological cycles, organic carbon sinks, soil dynamics, and above all global climate regulation. [116][4]
But these forested lands are most critical, in a global climate context, because of their role as carbon stores; organic
matter in vegetation and soils constitutes a tremendous percent of the available carbon within the biosphere.
Research utilizing deforestation data from the first decade of the 21st century has indicated that global forest clearing
accounts for roughly 10%, ±3%, of global GHG emissions. [49][3][47][43] It is important to note that these calculations are
notoriously difficult to ascertain; most GHG emissions can be tracked from consumption figures. Forests are
incredibly dynamic, with carbon levels varying across all biomes and localized ecosystems. Many models cannot
usually account for the spatial uniqueness across so many forest systems, such that GHG emissions concerning
deforestation are oftentimes not adequately, and underwhelmingly incorporated into emission severity calculations.
Nevertheless, when these forests are cleared, usually though slash-and-burn tactics, considerable quantities of
carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide are released. [90] Bolivian forests have been approximated to contain 150
metric tons of carbon per hectare, equivalent to 550 tCO2e/hA [e: equivalent, which accounts for CH4, N2O, and other
F-gases, adjusted to their radiative effect compared with CO2]; only an average of 10 tCO2/hA is sequestered from
the resulting agricultural land uses. [6][99][84] Subtracting the modest agrarian CO2 capture, and using an average of
300,000 hA of forests cleared per year, up to 162 million tCO2 are released per year (not accounting for other GHGs),
just from land-use change. [6] To put this in perspective, one gallon of E10 gasoline produces 18.95 lbs. of CO2e; [52] a
car with a fuel economy of 25 mpg could drive 1,559,538 miles and emit the same 550 tCO2e that comes from the
deforestation of a single Bolivian hectare. As such, 60% of the countries GHG emissions are estimated to belong
explicitly to deforestation and land-use change, which shows the drastic effect these forests have upon the global
atmospheric carbon budget. [14]
Yet these figures are only part of the story. When the resulting agricultural uses of these deforested lands are
incorporated, 85%, ±5%, of Bolivia’s total GHG emissions belongs to agriculture, in particular livestock production
and mechanized agriculture, and land-use change. The remaining portion is due in part to energy, transportation,
industrial processes, and waste management. [14][95][1][105][84] Farmed agriculture is much less a source of GHGs than
cattle, despite the emissions from machinery, fertilizer, and chemical usage. On a global scale, much of the
“estimated 35% of global greenhouse-gas emissions” produced by agriculture and land use comes from “livestock
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production.” [85][57] The production of livestock, including emissions resulting from deforestation for grazing and feed
harvest, soil carbon loss in said grazing lands, energy consumption in feed-grain production and processing,
transportation of grains and meats, nitrous oxide release from fertilizer use, and gases from manure and enteric
fermentation (particularly methane) account for approximately 18% of global GHG emissions. [57][124][34][78] This
estimate constitutes 9% of CO2 emissions, 35-40% CH4 (methane) emissions, and 65% of N2O (nitrous oxide),
globally. The latter two compounds, despite having a shorter half-life, possess “a much greater near-term warming
potential over several ensuing decades than does carbon dioxide.” [78][57] Given that around 35% of Bolivia’s land is
utilized by agriculture - 32% for grazing pasture and only 3% for cultivation, it becomes apparent that cattle
production is the chief agrarian pursuit, both directly or supplementary. [110] As such, a significant portion of Bolivia’s
GHG emissions, especially due to the majority of lands cleared explicitly for grazing, can be solely ascribed to the
livestock industry. Within the framework of climate change, these industries have formidable relevancy; the stories of
the Bolivian agrarian sectors are but one piece of a very complex, interwoven climate puzzle, yet one that demands
clarity and action.
Regardless, it is necessary to keep these figures within a continental and global perspective. Bolivia, not unlike other
developing countries that are rampantly clearing their forests to promote economic and civil prosperity, is
characterized by inefficiency in regards to GHG emissions; they are the 95th largest economy in the world, but
believed to be within the top fifty greatest GHG emitters. [10][32][120] Yet this discrepancy is understandable, given the
state of economic development. Many of the first world countries were once at a stage where industrialization and
market diversification came at the cost of exorbitant emissions and natural ecosystem degradation. The difference,
therefore, is the time in which these advancements take place, now with the understanding of a global carbon budget
to stave off the worst effects of a climate crisis. The per-capita emissions of total GHG emissions in Bolivia - with an
estimated population of 11.36 million - is approximated to be 10.4 mt/CO2e/person/year, roughly half that of current
emissions per capita/year in the USA. [1][118] This goes to show the incredible effect these forests have on the global
atmospheric environment, and the role they play both in development and future climate balances. And given the
majority of these emissions owing to land use, it also substantiates the consumptive chasm between countries such
as the United States and Bolivia. When compared to the neighboring agricultural giants Brazil, Argentina, and
Paraguay, utilizing previous LUC and deforestation data, Bolivia is only second to Brazil in terms of GHG emissions
resulting from agriculture and land-use change; Bolivia’s GHG emissions from these sectors further exceed those of
Columbia, Venezuela, and Peru. [111] This is a crucial comparison, for the agricultural outputs of Bolivia are drastically
underwhelmed by those of the neighboring MERCOSUR countries. This signals a dramatic difference in efficiencies,
when compared to GHG emissions; the rich forests of Bolivia are being sacrificed at great peril to the global climate,
for a level of food production and security that is underwhelmed by neighboring countries. It is evident that these
lands, especially through the interests of foreign investment, are not valued for their environmental or ecological
character, but purely for margins of profitability.
This is the ultimate divide present in Bolivia, in that the impacts imparted upon the lands and the global atmospheric
balances are in contention with the forces experienced from an already changing climate, resulting from a history of
more developed countries destabilizing this shared equilibrium. As with most of the developing world, Bolivia is faced
with an unjust dilemma: the need to further develop and bring prosperity and welfare to its people, as has long been
facilitated in more affluent countries, contrasted with the pressing demands of a shortening fuse concerning our
climatic bubble. A history of foreignization in the agricultural industries of Bolivia must not be underwhelmed, as it
promotes a disarticulation between the point of consumption and production; those that utilize these lands are oft not
accountable for the resulting emissions. [123] The Department of Santa Cruz, predominantly defined by its agrarian
exploits, is unlike any other Department in Bolivia due to most of rural Bolivia being characterized by small-scale land
ownership and minimal production values. The commoner in Bolivia is not truly at fault for such impacts, clearly. The
current challenges faced are extensive and the realities of our changing world has begun to dictate a shifting way of
life and an unfamiliar relation to the natural systems which once reliably bore health and wellness.
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Observations
Methodology
This project notably respects Dr. Xxxxxx Xxxx Xxxxxxx Xxxxx as a key
informant (hereby referred to), for his considerable and invaluable
support in introducing the author to the cultural, structural, and personal
nuances of the modern Bolivia. My key informant is a third-generation
rancher, heralding from the Department of Chuquisaca, where he
manages his 1,200 hectare property. He has owned multiple ranches
across the Departments of Chuquisaca and Santa Cruz and currently
possesses an additional 1,200 hectares near the Río Grande, in the
southern Santa Cruz lowlands. During the winter and shoulder seasons,
he works as a deforester, managing a team of workers and three
tractors. His understandings of land use and land clearing represented
an opportunity to engage with a locally astute individual.
Interviews were semi-structured and informal, largely respecting the
landowner's willingness and available time. The interviews were
conducted in such a way as to allow the interviewee to expand upon
topics they responded to well, without agitating particular questions that
may not have been appropriate at the given time. Only select interviews
were recorded, which reflected the authors judgement to the nature and
comfort of the interview. As such, these interviews were not intended to
be an aggregate, standardized data source, but a dynamic, and
personable glimpse into the lives and struggles of the Bolivian farmer or
rancher. These were semi-informal, participant directed interviews, with
the intent being to gain an insight into their livelihoods and history with
their lands, yet at their own discretion. Interviews usually ranged from
20 to 90 minutes in length. Furthermore, comments and quotes were
translated at the time of the interview with the help of my key informant,
and then recorded interviews retranslated by a secondary source.
Confidentiality was of the utmost importance concerning the
acceptance of the interview. Interviews were only conducted following a
contractual understanding that their anonymous honesty was purely for
academic interests, without consequence from any governmental or
legal body. This is evident given the unstable nature of individual
landowner and authoritative relation, and the distrust in candid criticism.
Many feared such truths could recur harms in the form of political
mistreatment upon their lands and livelihoods. As such, and to protect
the identity of all those who willingly gave their time to this project, only
last names will be used, omitting first and family names. As well, no
photos of the participants will be tied to an identity. Most of these
interviews would also not have been possible without the support of my
key informant; many of the interviewees only agreed to partake
because of their friendship, relation, or local knowledge of my key
informant or their respect for his family or connection as a mutual land
owner. Despite the association with my key informant, the author
recognizes no conflict of interest, as the interviews were answered
purely as the individual’s own opinions and understandings.
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A total of thirty interviews were conducted, split evenly between the Departments of Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca.
This was to give a dynamic glimpse into the differences between the lowlands and the mountainous valleys of the
Andean foothills. Santa Cruz is almost entirely flat, making an advantageous landscape for mechanization and single
commodity intensification. In comparison, the topography of Chuquisaca shows much more vertical relief; most of the
land is unusable due to its steepness. Land clearing in Santa Cruz is relatively uninhibited by natural forces, with the
only limitations to deforestation being seasonal, governmental or monetary. Lands in Chuquisaca, on the other hand,
can only be cleared by hand, either by a chainsaw or axe, with the felled forest matter then being burned.
Furthermore, the forests of Chuquisaca are by in large taller than Santa Cruz, requiring much more labor to clear. In
essence, to eke out a livelihood in the Department of Chuquisaca is exponentially harder; those that live there are not
making much more than what is required to sustain themselves. This demonstrates a critical contradiction to the
Santa Cruz lowlands, where market liberties, lax environmental regulation and foreign capital have chastised a reality
of agrarian abuse and considerable profit margins.
It is necessary to identify certain misgivings and potential inaccuracies of this research. The Bolivian peoples are a
reserved culture, and conversations concerning money or income can often be considered impolite. As well,
considering a sensitive political climate, and a history of land owner abuse by governmental organizations, there is
the potential that certain land ownership statistics are misrepresented, by order of the landowner, so as to protect
their interests. This is largely due to a suspicion of outsiders, in particular foreign academics, with the fear that the
individuals might use their honesty against them; other research has confirmed these tendencies. [96] Of the thirty
interviews, the author was rejected for three more, which could be attributed to the contradiction of land use and
environmental research. Furthermore, there was a heavy male bias within the range of interviewees: only two of the
thirty interviewees were female. Bolivia has a much more traditionalist view of gender equality, where the man
manages the land, and the woman oversees the house. Interviews were therefore predominantly expected and
directed toward men.
Finally, given the potential for discrepancy in the belief of connections between land use and climate change,
interviews were structured in a personal, observational manner so as not to discourage the landowner. Questions not
placing blame upon the interviewee - such as witnessed changes and injustices - were much more likely to be
elaborated upon than those which directly addressed the links between agriculture, deforestation and a changing
climate. Interviewees ranged from twenty five to eighty years of age, which demonstrates a wide range of collective
knowledge, and a personal and generational connection to their lands. The collective body of interviewees
represented a total land ownership of 45,029 hA. Overall, despite the potential for inaccuracies within a social
interview methodology, the conducted interviews represented a unique opportunity to see into the lives of some of
the most earnest and hardworking people in Bolivia, while affording a new perspective on climate change, through
the eyes of those whose lives and livelihoods will most likely be severely affected.
The interview outline is attached in the Appendix.
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Climatic Changes Through the Eyes of Locals
Temperature
The most recognizable and distinct aspect of a transforming climate - temperature - was the first witnessed change
many of the locals cited. It holds considerable relevance surrounding many of the secondary and tertiary
transmutations of climate change; temperature dictates variations in water availability, seasonality, and biological
domain. Every single individual asked about the variations within the recent climate acknowledged that temperate
had risen to some extent. Even those that did not directly concede to the realities of climate change could not deny
that conditions were warming. Dr. Xxxxxxx Aguirre commented on how it was no longer possible to work outside
without a shirt; “ten minutes and my skin begins to burn.” Señor Xxxxxx Barba and Señor Xxxxxxxx Gallo attributed
this to the sun now being closer to Earth than in previous decades, drying out the earth much more quickly than
before. And temperature is a considerably personal sensation, such that those who work their entire lives outside are
most likely sensitive to changes in the conditions within which they labor. “By ten in the morning, it is now so hot that
I can feel the heat through the shirt on my back,” said Señor Xxxx Poiqui. Temperature in the Andean foothills, such
as within the Department of Chuquisaca, was reported to be rising more swiftly than in the lowlands - a phenomenon
that stands in line with other research. [116][90][103] Global average temperature has risen an estimated 0.8℃ since preindustrial times, but a shifting climate hastens extreme temperature fluctuations, oftentimes many degrees above the
previous norm. [57] And with the advent of a locally decreased albedo (solar radiative reflectivity) through land-use
change, natural resource consumption and urbanization, the effect of temperature increases is compounded. Señor
Xxxxxx Fuentes and Señora Xxxxx Cruz both concurred that outlying heat waves were now on average six to seven
degrees Celsius higher, from 28-30℃ to 36-40℃, than during their childhood, a conjecture upheld by a life spent
living and working the same lands. In the lowlands, near the Brazilian shield, Señor Xxxxxx Peixoto, along others
interviewed in the immediate area, spoke of the temperatures reaching 45℃ - a warmth so great that it is now
unbearable to work during the hottest part of the day. Señor Xxxxx Cabrera simply remarked on how incredibly hot it
had become. And it was indisputable how evident the changes in temperature are, as apparent through the seasonal
divergences of available water reserves.
Conversely, many spoke to a greater variation in temperature, with winter heralding new levels of coolness and
humidity changes. Especially in the mountainous valleys, the winter months are beginning to bring about
temperatures seldom before present. As Señor Xxxxx Lopez P. stated, the nights are becoming colder, with a greater
temperature differential between the highs and lows. Señor Xxxxxxx Prior noted how his property is experiencing
more cold spells, which he attributed to the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO); Señor Xxxxx Pedraza questioned
why the cold was still present in October, when it had only ever been felt in June and July. And most commented on
the arrival of frosts during the winter, something only rarely before experienced. This presented many challenges for
their crops and animals, as these cold snaps are exacting on their assets. In October, 2018, Señor Xxxxx Pedraza
spoke of colleagues losing more than 100 cows when it rained for 48 hours and the temperature fell to 8℃, a cold to
which the cattle were not habituated. These temperature dichotomies were recounted as an increasing difficulty, for
the temperatures are increasing in the summer and decreasing in the winter, thus offering challenges on both fronts.
Seasons
In terms of reportings from the interviews, most focused around the nature of the seasons, specifically distinctions in
the year bringing temperature and rainfall changes to signal the beginning of planting and/or end of harvest. These
delineations are progressively becoming invariant; the rains no longer come when expected, the weather obeys no
previous pattern, and the susceptibility to crop loss has surged. Señor Xxxxx Pedraza, like many generational
producers, keeps a journal of year to year variations, and stated the variations in seasonality first began around
1990. As Señor Xxxxxx Alba remarked, “we used to plant in September, then October, November, December, and
now January; the seasons are the same, but the conditions and months are different.” These are not subtle shifts, a
changing of the planting season by many months indicate a substantial, impactful displacement of the
understandings and undertakings passed from generation to generation. Many landowners stated their insecurity
concerning the time of year to plant, given that what they learned over the course of their lives from their trade was
now ineffectual if the seasons, and thus the rains, did not behave with some sense of consistency. Señor Xxxxx
Aguilar commented that “we do not know what season we are in,” a sentiment reflected by several landowners. A
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heightened reason for this is due to climatic cycles, such as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, Pacific Decadal
Oscillation, and the Antarctic Oscillation; climate patterns that are exacerbated by changes in land cover, such as
from deforestation. [102] These seasonal influencers are increasingly becoming more pronounced and irregular. [104]
Señor Xxxxxx Alpire expressed his worries about the changing seasons, because he cannot plant without accepting
a greater margin of risk, in particular the potential to lose a lot of money. Nearly every landowner expounded on the
presence of shifting seasons, in many variations, yet across disparate biomes and with spatially dynamic
consequences.
Rainfall, Drought & Flooding
For most farmers and ranchers, the rains are one
of the solely important facets to either a plentiful or
deficient production. Without a source of irrigation,
most crops are directly tied to the rains. Livestock
is also directly affected, as a lack of rains means
the animal will begin to lose weight and apatite. In
effect, the rains are the single unpredictable force
that many Bolivian people depend upon to ensure
a margin of profitability within their harvests. Many
of the interviewees spoke directly to losing a
percent or the entirety of a harvest from the lack of
rains. As Señor Xxxxxx Zeraín recounted, once the
rains started to shift, crops began to fail because of
unpredictability. Essentially, what was once a very
Figure 13: Projected Total Annual Renewable Water for 2050
foreseeable, reliable period of precipitation has been (total natural renewable surface, groundwater, and inflows from
other countries).
replaced with increasingly erratic events of either
immense rainfall or extended periods of drought.
Señor Xxxxxx Barba spoke of his property needing 1,300 to 1,500mm of rain for his crops to survive, but now it can
rain upwards of 400mm in one day, followed by prolonged dry periods. Dr. Xxxxxxx Aguirre observed a shift from
intermittent, sustaining rains to heavy spells of rain for a week, followed by 20 to 30 days without. The norm of
uniform, consistent rain during defined seasons is now an inconsistent game of chance; either it might not rain
enough, or it might rain too much, resulting in the flooding and collapse of crops. For many, this variability was a
constant source of tribulation; the rains were anyone's guess. Given that the prosperity of one’s production is so
directly tied to the presence of water, many were feeling the stresses - to an increasing extent - of unstable harvests
or undernourished livestock.
On the one extreme is drought - a circumstance with increasing familiarity. Señor Xxxxxx Reyas, a large-scale
producer, commented on how every four to five years there is a drought, in parallel with consistent temperature
increases. Señor Xxxxx Cabrera spoke to the commonness of droughts now entirely killing a harvest, which he
directly attributed to climate change. The steady decline of water resources in Bolivia is not an outlying event; Bolivia
has been projected to become increasingly drier as the effects of a changing climate progress, with the most extreme
scenarios calling for a 19% decrease in rainfall in the immediate future. [40] Water is not optional for production;
without it the entirety of one’s investment into a planting might be lost. Nine years ago, Señor Xxxxxx Barba suffered
a dry year, where it did not rain for ten months; he resorted to buying 60,000 litres of water a day to ensure the
survival of his 8,000 head of cattle. Señor Xxxxx Hugo bluntly stated that February of 2019 was the first time in his
entire life he had not seen it rain the entire month, during what is considered the height of the rainy season. With this
comes an increasing reliance on groundwater reserves, reservoirs increasingly being taxed and exhausted as more
become dependent upon these waters as a last hope. He also spoke of needing to irrigate his rice, sugarcane,
yucca, maize, and bananas in order to ensure survival, despite previous productivity. Señor Xxxxx Quintana
witnessed creeks and natural springs dry up on his property. Drought also has the potential to salinate groundwater
and runoff through mineral depletion, largely as a factor of varied precipitation, a phenomenon becoming increasingly
observed in the Santa Cruz lowlands. Moreover, many lowland landowners spoke to the risk associated with fires,
oftentimes caused by adjacent landowner burnings that run amok, blazing into other land holdings, and destroying
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Figure 14: A man rushes to a brush fire, which are of increasing occurrence during times of dryness and drought.

property assets. Fires are reported to be accelerating, both in severity and intensity, oftentimes caused by careless
human activity, such as individuals smoking when in the fields. Most often fueled by dried pastures or from desmonte
burnings, these fires have a greater potential to also burn into cortinas or outlying forest systems, therefore indirectly
attributing to a stronger wind potential. This is largely attributable to conditions of drought, where dry vegetative mass
is exceptionally susceptible to combustion.
Likewise, when it does rain, it usually carries the adverse effects of increased and potentially damaging runoff.
Flooding events, given the pliable nature of the soft soils, can bear dramatic change and impairment of resources or
infrastructure. These events have the opposite effect of dry spells, by oversaturating and washing away crops and
lands. Señor Xxxxxx Ferrolino spoke to the nature of flooding, and the resulting erosion and landslides, as a new
normal; something expected during part of the year, just as dryness is anticipated at others. And, given that flooding,
and heavy rainfall events often leaves a considerable body of standing water, Señor Xxxxxx Reyas spoke to the
marked increases in insects and parasites, many of which carry disease that can contaminate an otherwise strong
harvest or herd of animals. These vector-borne and water-borne diseases therefore have an adverse effect upon the
productivity and health of both the agriculture at hand and dependent individual. Consequently, rainfall for many
producers carries a predicament of impact, whereby the reliability and security afforded through such rains is quickly
being replaced by secondary effects that are damaging to the well-beings and livelihoods of farm and pasture.
Soil Erosion & Compaction
In conjunction with variable rainfall patterns, land cover change and increased pressure from livestock, Bolivia is
experiencing a noticeable increase in erosion, landslides and soil compaction. Up to 41% of Bolivian lands are
affected by erosion, particularly those with pronounced vertical relief that have been altered. [40] This suggests that
soil carbon is being lost to the atmosphere at an increased rate through the soil disturbances. [1] Erosion is most
directly tied to biomass cover, with forested areas being much less susceptible to structural soil loss. But of equal
importance is the surrounding intensity and duration of rain events. Erosion is increasing in many mountainous areas
not because of desmonte, but because of prolonged precipitation that supersaturates the steep slopes, exceeding
the supporting strength of organic cover. Erosion is often attributed to spikes in runoff; Señor Xxxxx Lopez P. lost a
reckoned two hA from erosion from the nearby river, consuming the soft soils of the banks following abrupt rain
events. Señor Xxxxxx Ferrufino lost what he estimated to be 10 hA due to natural erosion, both from creek overflow
and landslides due to oversaturated soils. These landslides are increasingly trying for rural communities. The
tenuous network of roads between many of the outlying municipalities are at the whim of destructive rain events,
where roads are washed out by landslides or a disproportionate runoff. In April of 2019, the road to Uruguay, in the
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Department of Chuquisaca, was closed for over two weeks, due to high runoff impacting hillsides and river crossings.
Both the closure of infrastructure and the loss of productive lands are obstacles for a landowner, which can signal
prospectively greater challenges.
Soil compaction can most directly be ascribed to livestock and machinery: overgrazing or overutilization of the land
due to nutrient depletion oftentimes results in tamping of the soil. This measurably reduces the productivity of the
soil, either for the grasses grown as forage or crops. Señor Xxxxx Cabrera remarked on his grasses dying due to an
inability to combat poorly aerated soils, saying even the strongest grasses now die especially when coupled with a
lack of water and periods of heat. Many smaller landholdings used to solve these problems by controlled burning,
which would cleanse the soils and aboveground biomass, as well as aerating the soil. Now this is banned in many
areas, leading to other difficulties. Señor Xxxxx Quintana spoke to the resulting challenges in restoring yield to
steeper lands, as tractor utilization is only possible on flatter areas. But, just as with erosion, increasingly torrential
rainfalls have a hand in such compression - drying and rewetting cycles of an increasingly drastic nature result in the
nutrient depletion and structural compromise of some soils, whereby compaction can come about without the
presence of domestic animals. [58] This therefore has a negative feedback effect on moisture infiltration by increasing
flooding from runoff and erosion potential. [90]
Disease, Parasite & Insect Blight
Underneath the entirety of the climate discussions is an undertone of pestilence; a slew of new, unknown, and
relatively misunderstood problems now confronting farmers and ranchers in the form of novel pests. For many
livestock producers, these afflictions are causing severe problems, as the advent of partially uncontrollable and
uncontainable infections present a complication without an obvious solution. Meaning, in effect, the harms of the new
pests are ravenous, in part because of an absence of available knowledge concerning their effective combat. The
spread of exotic disease, parasites and insects is an accepted causality of our changing climate; warming conditions
allow both the traverse and flourishing of such agents to a more ample extent. [57] Furthermore, greater increases in
droughts and floods, modulated in part by ENSO and other climate cycles, is changing the temporal and
geographical distribution of such blights. [91] Señor Xxxxxx Fuentes spoke to the sudden losses he has experienced
in his cattle to disease and the unpredictable and aggressive nature of such furtive threats. Señor Xxxxx Lopez P., in
agreement with most livestock owners, declared that any animal will now die without treatment against new
menaces. He went on to say that before there were not so many ‘bugs,’ but “now the fields are sick.” The following,
although in no way inclusive, are the maladies that landowners are struggling with that are either becoming more
challenging or recently identified:
Disease/Parasites
● Fasciolosis: A parasitic infection derived from the common liver fluke. It is largely transmuted through
livestock, but has the potential to infect humans, usually those in close proximity to infected
water/pasture areas. [20] It is largely observed through gastrointestinal upset, and can bring about sudden
changes in weight, water retention, and the potential for animal death. This was commonly referred to
throughout the interviews, especially in Chuquisaca, and was suggested with an uptick in prevalence.
This parasite is especially prevalent in Bolivia compared to the rest of the world; human infections as a
result are comparatively high.
● Unnamed: A newer unknown disease in cattle renders the beast with a deteriorating hide, whereby the
cow will scratch the skin from their hides. They then become inflicted with a fever, before their “eyes
become white (from blindness), and they become brave,” just before dying. Interviewees in Chuquisaca
and Santa Cruz spoke to symptoms that compared similarly.
● Augeske: Some swine in Chuquisaca have now begun to demonstrate ‘lameness,’ whereby an infection
leaves the pig immobile due to joint infection. Landowners believe this is a new parasitic or bacterial
infection; its arrival was first witnessed in 2018.
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● Gummosis Disease: A common infection of fruit trees through the
roots, this disease reportedly expunged the entirety of fruiting
trees in Chuquisaca, specifically citrics, near the turn of the
century. Before the Department’s valleys were a haven of fruit
production, but the trees will not grow or produce now to even
near the same extent.
○ A new disease now affects the other orange trees in
the region; the only solution being to selectively
breed and splice species in an attempt to gain
immunity. As Señor Xxxxxx Baldiviezo described,
citrics are also reportedly dying in the lowlands,
producing for 2-3 years. He has lost hundreds of
trees to an unknown affliction.
Larva/Insects
● El Burro: A flesh eating worm that infects cattle, but is also
infrequently present in sheep and pigs. The Burro is a new
problem that arrived within the last few years for many farmers
(my key informant first witnessed it in his cattle in 2018). Spread
through larvae lain by livestock flies, these worms can grow to
centimeters in length, and are visibly obvious on cattle in the
form of a grim flesh sore or wound. Their presence requires the
constant attention of a rancher, as they can lead to fatalities with
swiftness if left untreated. They are commonly remedied by an
antibiotic spray, but there is no preventative treatment. As Señor
Xxxxx Aguilar attested, as a livestock merchant, the worm eats
through the hide, rendering it useless. It also leaves the meat
darker, stickier (sugary) and with a different taste; it is still sold,
albeit 2-3 Bs/kg lower in price. My key informant and Señor
Xxxxxx Alba remarked on the observation of this worm now
spreading to humans.
● Miasis: Many of the sheep are affected by a worm which is
spread through the larvae of flies that targets flesh and muscles.
The consumption of the sheep’s tissue by this worm can lead to
crippling, and potential fatality in the sheep, if not swiftly treated
with antibiotics.
● Gusano of the Corn: Mentioned by nearly every landowner, the
caterpillar of the corn was an endemic challenge during planting.
The caterpillar can eat near the entirety of the crop and can only
be eradicated through pesticide spraying, often more than once
a harvest. Many spoke to the pronounced magnification of the
problem with noticeable increases following heavy precipitation
events.
● Salivazo: Señor Xxxxxxxx Gallo and Señor Xxxxxx Baldiviezo
spoke of a small insect present within their pastures that affects
the roots of the grass, causing them to dry out and die. This has
notable consequence on livestock health; both are unsure how
to treat such sickness without burning or excessive chemical
use. They believe this insect is evolving, citing that it is
beginning to taint other grasses. It is a new pest, having just
become apparent.
Figure 15: Tokura
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Tokura: In the lowlands, according to my key informant and Señor Xxxxxxx Marquez, locusts have
arrived from Argentina within the last years and with destructive potential. These insects, which can be
over 15 cm long, devour pasture grasses and arrive in deleterious abundance. My key informant spoke
of landowners not being able to fumigate against them because of the sheer volume that were present
and flying. They reproduce very quickly, laying hundreds of eggs, which hatch within a few days. The
current pesticides used will not harm the eggs. Similarly, many note a distinctive rise in grasshopper
populations in the last 1-3 years.
Pikudo: An insect which attacks soybeans and cotton, among others, by taking nutrients from the plant
roots. According to Señor Xxxxxxx Marquez, the affected plant will appear healthy, but will not produce.
It is excessively hard to eliminate, requiring the application of a specialty, ‘Red-Label’ pesticide, that has
reportedly killed chickens and dogs, which have consumed the dead insect.
Chinchi/Chupador: Insects that, in particular, attacks the soybean and bean crops, respectively.
Some ranchers commended on the recent proliferation of ticks within the grasses, again voicing that
their numbers usually increase following the rains. While mostly contagion free, their presence is
routinely noticed amongst livestock. Señor Xxxxx Virnez believed they are becoming more resistant to
his administration of antibiotics and sprays.

Casawi: A natural response seen within the corn to sudden changes in water uptake or sunlight. Nearly
every landowner commented on dealing with this condition, usually after an intense rain, and then a
period of warmth. The corn leaf yellows, partially due to an inability to absorb nitrogen, which results in
a 20-30% reduction in production. This is reportedly uncommon in past years, but is more recently
apparent, which might largely be attributed to a greater variance between precipitation and dry spells.
Gangrena: Señor Xxxxxx Alpire spoke to the presence of gangrene with certain young, healthy cows,
possibly leading to fatality. This death of tissue though infection might be caused in part by abrupt
changes in temperature and moistures, resulting in an abnormal, illy-adapted living condition for the
young animal.
Rabies & Canine Distemper: My key informant spoke to a recent need to now vaccinate most dogs
against such infectious diseases, a practice that was previously unnecessary for an infirmity with
relative rareness.

In effect, many of these complications present considerable challenge and strife by virtue of their volatility. As Señor
Xxxxxx Alba and my key informant observed, these diseases and infections evolve from year to year, wherein each
season requires a margin of experimentation and vulnerability to new, unknown strains of alien agents. Many of
these landowners are laboriously increasing their use of antibiotics and vaccinations; my key informant spoke of the
need to continuously up the dosage and concentration of inoculations. Especially concerning livestock, the expansion
in diseases, parasites and infections leads to an imperativeness of antibiotics. Señor Xxxxx Lopez P. and Señor
Xxxxxxx Marquez, among others, conveyed the need for treatment, without which they face widespread losses
amongst their stock. And even with the continual usage of medical assistance, many landowners already are at risk
from previously known and novel infections, merely because they are emerging and adapting beyond their limited
control. Livestock are an increasing medium for infectious disease transmission to humans; in the face of an altering
climate, the passage of virulent agents between animal host and human is becoming more apparent. [57] Likewise,
the interdependence on antibiotics, in accelerated potency, leads to more resistant and adaptive strains of
contagions, oftentimes creating a cyclical feedback mechanism whereby continued antibiotic use only serves as an
interim solution to a robustly maturing problem. [72] Effectively, the conditions of a changing climate, through the
myriad causalities, is driving an underlying flourishment of diseases, parasites and infective and exotic insects, which
is forging a reality of increased vulnerability to unknown afflictive assail.
Local Economic Conditions
Combined with decreases in production, the economy was the underlying factor of worry amongst all producers;
without a fair mechanism of commerce, the individual cannot hope to uphold their remunerations and way of life.
Thus the worry of a changing climate for many Bolivians is not one of climatic happenings, but one rooted within the
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consequences impacting their means and assets. And this is understandable, as the many ramifications of our
humanistic condition are largely ingrained within the passings of personal and financial prosperity. It is effectually the
core of the ecological and environmental damages we as a species have left upon this world. Nearly every
interviewee mentioned the economy - given its immediately distinctive state - as either a perceived risk or benefit
within their vocations. Many felt the money earned from their labors was no longer worth the same, and that certain
economies were falling. Señor Xxxxxxx Darepé stated the money no longer holds the same purchasing power,
effectively requiring more work for the same amount of time. Much of these new distresses surrounding income
originate from market saturation, specifically within the livestock sector. The markets of Santa Cruz, influenced by
larger-scale operations, exceeds their margins of consumption, so meats and animal products are imported to other
metropolitan areas - such as La Paz, Sucre and Tarija - thereby undercutting the already satisfied supply. This is
further hampered by the inability for Bolivia to export animal products, despite the desire by many of the countries’
ranchers. In whole, most of the country is now facing a net excess of animal products, resulting in falling prices and
wages for producers. Señor Xxxx Portales spoke of producing, but not having anyone to which to sell, meaning more
often they are producing only to feed themselves. Señora Xxxxx Cruz described the economy being stronger even a
few years ago, but now sometimes not even being able to sell due to oversupply, even if ready and necessary. Señor
Xxxxxx Fuentes did not believe the economy would improve in the foreseeable future; Señor Xxxxxxxx Gallo
asserted “the economy is going, and we are becoming poor. Many are leaving to other places, where it is more
favorable, and we cannot stay above our dues, as the money is always for payments.” Señor Xxxxxx Ferrufino
expressed discord now being at the age of fifty, and only just surviving from his work, when he should be making
enough money to have a buffer for later years. He cited the rife presence of political abuse, saying that “we are not
making the money we should be.” Wages (and prices) are rising in the city, but remain unchanged or falling for him
and his work. And much of this has resulted in considerable migration; the urban areas of Bolivia are growing at
inordinate rates, while many of the rural areas are suffering desertion and crumbling communities. With this comes
an absence of laborers; many of the landowners expressed frustration over not having a reliant outfit of workers, as
the majority immigrate to the cities in the hopes of finding a better salary or due to neoteric social queues. In fact,
some landowners spoke of shifting cultivation from sewn crops to livestock because of the lacking of labor, as
ranching requires a smaller workforce.
As Señor Xxxxx Pedraza postulated, fluctuations are because the Bolivian markets are not prepared for periods of
invariance, thus creating a vulnerability to loss. The advent of economic forces from surrounding countries and
international participation ensures the Bolivian markets remain continually susceptible to outlying instability.
Unsurprisingly, a select few in the lowlands, such as those within larger-scale productions, remarked on the recent
improvements within the economy. Given that the rates of deforestation have remained largely unchanged for the
last decade, the demand for new cleared lands indicates that the economy is still is relatively stable for certain
agrarian products, usually those which depend on an international market. Señor Xxxxxxx Prior, a deforester with a
sizeable arsenal of tractors, questioned “if there are changes arising from desmonte, why is the economy still rising?”
These contradictions between the Andean foothills and the lowlands speak to the exploitative nature of closeted
neoliberal policy, which predominantly instigates immediate steady and discernible economic security and growth,
but usually at the direct expense of the surrounding environmental systems which uphold the nation and population.
Thus, an extractive history of prosperity might typically be followed by a decline in developmental proliferation, as has
been seen in Bolivia since 2014, whereby the originative succession of resource utilization is now borne a reality of
consequence through damaging environmental and social effect, largely upon those least adaptable but most
defenseless. This is effectively seen in the causations of our changing climate, both within and as a result of Bolivian
influence, but overwhelmingly more so because of the greater global narrative. Consequently, a shifting climate is
now most directly affecting the independent producer, thus in turn impacting economic welfare; the combined effect,
as Señor Xxxxxxx Marquez professed, meaning that “we are earning little more than milk money.”
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Analysis & Discussion
Literal Aspects of Deforestation
Bulldozers - or tractores, as referred to by the Bolivians - are the primary instrument of lowland deforestation. They
are responsible for two types of deforestation layouts, referred to as desmonte: either following a set parameter of
wind barriers, or fanning out in a series of wedges from a central water source, with the latter being less common.
The former, as demanded by the ABT (The Regulatory Agency for the Social Control of Forests and Lands), is in
place to ensure that clearings do not follow historical precedents, where lands are cleared in every direction, without
the necessary boundaries to dissipate winds. The ABT requires, regardless of cardinal direction, that cortinas are left
every 200-350 meters, perpendicular to the direction of clearing, which is often kilometers in length. Desmonte firstly
begins with the toppling of the largest vegetative mass, through the use of a chain drawn between two bulldozers,
positioned roughly 50m apart. The resulting felled mass is then pushed into cordones, which are furrows of debris
that run parallel to the direction of clearing, also spaced every 50m. This is primarily because a tractor can begin in
the middle of a recently felled area, and push the forest matter 25m to each side. These cordones, having amassed
most of the downed forest material, are subsequently burned to erase the final remains of vegetation. This timber is
predominantly burned instead of harvested, despite its potential value, due to the tedious requirements for lumber
harvesting put in place by the ABT. Depending on the amount of material, these fires can grow out of control, either
burning into the cortinas or overheating and sterilizing the soils underneath. Desmonte can only take place in the dry
winter seasons as tractors often become stuck or damaged if working in sodden soils. Furthermore, operating when
wet usually results in a greater amass of soil in the cordones, occasionally stripping the lands of the invaluable
topsoil.

Figure 16: Recently felled forest, before the cortinas are burned.
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There are two sizes of tractors: smaller ones weighing 28 tons, which are more maneuverable and efficient, and
larger ones, weighing near 45 tons, which are workhorses in expansive clearing. Given an already achieved role in
previous forest clearings, these behemoths are largely imported as used equipment from northern countries. The
smaller tractors cost around $75K USD, the larger $120K USD; both require considerable expenditure for
maintenance and upkeep. As well, these bulldozers are expensive and oftentimes dangerous to transport. Alongside
the continual replacement of parts, the tractors also consume an inordinate amount of diesel; a 28mt tractor will use
roughly 600 liters; a 45mt tractor will use 1000 litres for one 23-hour day of work. Incorporating the cost of fuel
transportation, my key informant pays up to $800 - $900 USD a day, per tractor, just for diesel. On top of this are the
costs of workers, including tractor operators, mechanics, cooks, and laborers. My key informant pays his tractor
drivers $7 USD an hour, a wage which exceeds that of most Bolivian doctors or teachers. They work 23 hours a day;
one shift from 02:00 to 14:00, and another from 15:00 until 02:00, 6 days a week. Such an aggressive work schedule
ensures that the greatest amount of clearing can be done within the time afforded. Two large tractors, using a chain
(costing $150 USD per meter), can fell upwards of 60 to 70 hA of ‘low’ forest in a day, grossing nearly $8K USD, at
$120 USD per hA. Higher forests, such as those in the northern part of the country, are more challenging to clear,
sometimes requiring chainsaws to fell the largest trees. My key informant charges $400 per hA of low forest, and
$600 per hA of high forest; the cost of felling by chain usually being contracted out to operators with larger tractors. A
single, smaller tractor can clean 4 to 6 hA in a 24-hour period - a larger tractor 6 to 8 hA - pushing the razed foliage
into cordones. This results in a net profit of nearly $1K USD, per tractor, per day of work, without the advent of
mechanical problems. In a successful season, my key informant can clear 4,000 hA, with his team of twenty workers.
Illegal deforestation is largely quelled, which might lead one to believe in a reduction in clearing rates. This has been
achieved primarily through the induction of satellite imagery, allowing for more precise monitoring of land-use
change. Instead, the current Bolivian government has simply made it more advantageous to comply to desmonte
stipulations; rates of deforestation remained largely unchanged since the advent of the MAS administration. The ABT
charges a variable fee per hectare of clearing, largely determined by the equivalent value and amount of timber on
the land. Forests with the greatest amount of biomass, such as those in the northern departments, incur a cost of up
to $80 USD, per hA; most lands receive a permiso de desmonte that equates to roughly $35 USD per hA. This levy is
placed upon the landowner, so deforestation operations that do not have authoritative permission risk severe fines
and the potential confiscation of all operable machinery or lands. There is, however, no spatial limitations to
deforestation; an uneven patchwork of clearing often results in forest system fragmentation. Aside from the climatic
implications of fractured clearings, there are also considerate local effects. Irregular patterns of deforestation create
uneven land heating, and thus additive sectarian climates, usually in the form of increased winds. Cortina aspect,
although effective, does not completely displace these winds.
By in large, the Bolivian people do not generally associate land-use change with climate impacts. Those of a northern
disposition might see deforestation as an evil, but in Bolivia it is a necessary process to access lands that are
otherwise effectively unworkable. The forests are dense and impassible and possess no relevant, acquirable use left
untouched. The cultivation of these lands is what allows the majority of the locals to sustain and support themselves,
either directly or indirectly. As my key informant shrewdly commented, “We do the desmonte to have a better life the land is unusable without it. [...] We would not do the desmonte if we did not have mouths to feed.”
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From Implementation to Abandonment
Given the majority of the most valuable, productive, and accessible lands
are primarily owned by large-scale agrarian management, lands are now
predominantly cleared for livestock pastures along the frontier expansion
zones. Preparing deforested lands for farmed production is roughly double
the cost of blunt clearing, given that the remaining below-surface organic
material must be withdrawn, and the soil prepared for uniform, mechanized
tillage. As such, the up-front investment costs of new lands being utilized for
sown crops is considerably more; many nationals that buy lands to work
within the agrarian industry default to cattle ranching because of the reduced
overhead. Through the advent of multinational business, specifically within
the agriculture industry in Bolivia, the associated international costs ensure
that plantation investment ventures are much less attainable for the typical
individual. This creates an imbalance that is reflected within food security
and carbon emissions; a deficiency in crops produced because of
inaccessibility to ample capital creates a dependence on international
market fluctuations of agro-business, as well as a secondary regression to
livestock production, which is considerably more emission intensive than
sown foods. Therefore, Bolivia currently exhibits a market surplus of cattle
products, and a varying reliance on staple grain imports. Ranching and
stocking practices vary spatially across regions and are largely dependent
on forest characteristics, elapsed knowledge and social custom. Most crops
grown by smallholder farms were used as cattle feed, often without the
ability to rotate harvests or leave furrow, given seasonal limitation. Some
solved this by moving the location of planting entirely, every few years, once
soil productivity began to falter. When foliage allowed, browsing, or the
grazing of livestock within uncleared understory forest systems, was
present, which usually resulted in decreased stocking rates at the expense
of efficiency and forest condition. Stocking rates generally are found to be
two head of cattle per hectare, however decreased rates were observed in
drier forests and increased rates in taller, more productively lush
environments. In combination with a lack of widespread understanding of
rotational grazing, overstocking occasionally resulted in the malnutrition or
death of animals. In combination with an escalation of production-reducing
climatic inputs - such as drought, flooding or infectious agents - many
ranchers witness a decline in the supportive capacity of their lands and a
decrease in the physical condition of their herds.
Nevertheless, once a certain quantity of land is owned under a single
business undertaking, the return on investment, or ‘break-even point,’ of
newly forested lands are substantially high. Most producers spoken to on
newly or recently cleared lands could recoup their investments in under five
years, with larger producers recovering their investments in approximately
three years. Mechanized agricultural production, by and large, is more
profitable per hectare, largely because profitability comes from the fiscal
efficiencies surrounding monocropping and mechanization. [84][83] However,
cattle production faces less taxation and market regulation, such that
profitability is still considerable above a certain echelon. These divergences
speak to the political criterions that certify continual market expansion into
virgin forests, mechanisms that continually devalue ecological resources and
carbon emissions both from deforestation and land use though
Figure 17: One of the many native species
that quickly grow to overtake lands.

36

advantageous profit margins. Given such, the average extent of land ownership in the Santa Cruz lowlands was far
lower than the Andean foothills; lands were largely purchased within the previous fifteen years for most interviewees
in Santa Cruz, while lands had been held multi-generationally, sometimes over a hundred years by a family in
Chuquisaca. One might argue that lands that are passed on intergenerationally are valued beyond their intrinsic
character to turn a profit, but also for their sentimental and locational importance within a familial and communal
structure. Meaning that many in the lowlands utilize the lands in a disparagingly extractive manner, but the majority of
the population, which is dispersed amongst the gradient from the Altiplano to intermountain valleys to rural lowland
settlements, likely utilize the lands in a more conscious and efficaciously healthy fashion.
Land prices have witnessed a considerable escalation in value, with lands closer to urbanized areas or road
infrastructure more progressively accruing worth. Lands that are cleared and seeded for pasture near the city of
Santa Cruz are presently worth upwards of $12K USD/hA, most lands within reasonable accessibility were worth $5K
USD/hA, with the farther outreaches of cleared lands being worth currently in the vicinity of $2-3K USD/hA. (Field Notes)
These lands have increased many-fold in value over the recent years; Señor Xxxxx Pedraza spoke of land prices
more than doubling within the immediate lowlands over the last five years. In combination with a heritage of
foreignization, this fashions an ever-increasing power within the hands of international interests. Lands purchased
near the turn of the century cost as little as $50 USD/hA - a time when an exorbitant amount of lands were bought by
foreign parties. (Field Notes) Those same land area units now hold millions upon millions of dollars of equitable value,
making it perpetually impossible for them to be reclaimed by Bolivian nationals. Furthermore, the process of
desmonte usually doubles the value of the lands, a process much more accessible to those with considerable sums
of capital, such as those working within an agro-business market complex. Credit systems within Bolivia are also
largely ineffectual to the individual producer; many interviewees expressed frustration around the ability to secure
loans to ensure production security. Or they are with an outrageous rate of interest, oftentimes nearing 25%. (Field
Notes)
It was largely surmised that banks exist to appeal to large-scale interests, a notion upheld by a political lineage
that pursued multinational investment through strategies that largely marginalized smallholders, indigenous and
those already in poverty-stricken surroundings. With the advent of climate related calamities, smallholder land
owners increasingly are defaulting on these credits - at no fault of their own - due to a failed harvest or production
year. This again encourages financial and asset accumulation from the many into the hands of the few, as those with
the most resources can more readily weather such adversity. These challenges for the independent entrepreneur
further come to a head within the current political tensions, whereby the atmosphere surrounding land use allowed an
element of allied partisan tribalism. Señor Xxxxxx Reyas professed provocation surrounding his agricultural yields
due to his political affiliation, a reality that required extensive corroboration to evade fallacious claims of money
laundering. This effectually means the entire spectrum of land ownership for the independent shareholder in Bolivia
is fraught with a profusion of travails.
And in the end, many of the outlying lands are deserted, through the myriad, variable complications faced by the
possessor. As mentioned, one obstacle is the precipitous regrowth of vegetative matter within pastured lands. The
slight climatic alterations allow ‘weeds’ to flourish, no longer able to be resolved through cutting, alleviated only with
the vigorous use of costly herbicides. Elsewise, the individual landowner need only a single bad harvest to face
financial uncertainty, leading to potential land abandonment. It is suggested that around 23% of the lands cleared
within the last three decades are currently undergoing a process of natural regeneration. [1] The arcane system of
land tenure ensures that abandoned lands are largely left untouched; without an organizational structure of
reclamation and reuse, virgin forested areas will continue to be cleared. And despite the sequestering factor of
vegetative regrowth, it is diminutive compared to the native carbon content held within the immediate lands. These
disparities surrounding land ownership and employment between the hierarchical scale of landholders entrenches an
undercurrent of susceptibility and incapacity against institutions which capitalize on the market potentials and
leniencies of the Bolivian agrarian sector. Meaning that at the end of the day, the Bolivian national of modest means
will be able to secure a living, but only just.
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Pesticide Use, Misuse & Abuse
As outlined in previous sections, the Bolivian government has long had a persuasive relationship with foreign
commercial interests. From land concessions to titling ambiguity and endowments in favor of multinational capital - all
under the guise of development, production security and modernization - the lineage of Bolivian administrative bodies
has been one of economic growth in favor of the privileged few, often at the expense of the many. [123] This became
especially obvious concerning the agricultural chemical market, which has been largely monopolized by four
multinational companies: DuPont, Dow AgroSciences, Bayer (which acquired Monsanto), and BASF. [89] These
corporations control the majority percent of pesticide and herbicide distribution as well as a stake in the seed supply.
(Field Notes)
And while their presence might not be seen as any more than the consequence of globalized agrarian
production, their social and political influence speaks to the iniquitous imbalances of economic prolificness and social
and environmental prosperity. Señora Xxxxxx Acuña directly spoke to their agrochemical influence in Bolivia,
whereby they would buy into local markets to obtain control and influence. And certain landowners spoke to principle
influence they had within the agrarian sector; the importation of agro-chemicals into Bolivia in 2014 totaled
2,046,743,103 Bolivianos (296,200,160 USD); the nominal importation of seeds totaling 235,617,927 Bs (34,098,108
USD). Given the relatively small-scale of Bolivian agriculture, the proportional spending on agro-chemicals shows a
considerable reliance on a subversive, potentially captured market. [89]
Why is it that only three specific strains of transgenic seeds are legalized? The use of GM seeds is banned, except
for RR soybean and one strain of sorghum; given the legalization in most neighboring countries, there exists an
underlying contraband seed market. (Field Notes) One might argue that these seeds are illicit not because of
philosophies demanding natural purity without interference (as dictated within The Law of Mother Earth), but because
of the increased need to apply pesticides and herbicides to harvested and hybridized [non-transgenic] seeds; the use
of genetically modified seeds has the potential to decrease total chemical application to a given harvest. With the
advent of many novel insects and diseases due to a changing climate, especially in the tropical regions, both
pesticide and herbicide use are on the rise. [57] Some producers interviewed in the Santa Cruz lowlands spoke of
needing to spray pesticides up to seven times during one planting; my key informant and Señor Xxxxx Pedraza
described areas where the presence of gusano (caterpillar/worm) was so prolific that it could be scooped off the
ground in handfuls after a fumigation. This was relevant across the entire spectrum of Bolivian agriculture; there was
not a single landowner spoken to that did not rely on chemical spraying in some form or another. GM seeds, although
controversially debated, could potentially reduce such a dependence on toxic chemical use, especially in the face of
a shifting climate.
Conversely, why is the cleaning of regrown vegetation and weeds through burning largely prohibited, especially in
the fertile valleys of Chuquisaca? It might be surmised that instead of a climatically defensive agenda, the ABT bans
burning because it substantially increases the dependence on herbicides. Burning is both a healthier and quicker
process for the local environment; it oftentimes kills any invasive insects or disease present within the soils or foliage.
Señor Xxxxx Lopez used to burn his fields until the prohibition was put in place by the ABT; the use of fire near the
end of winter removed all ticks, bugs, and weeds, while also helping to aerate and replenish the soils. Most
landowners, including my key informant, spoke to the challenging nature of this vegetation, which used to previously
be dealt with simply by cutting. But it was now re-growing so aggressively that it returns in force in six months,
making heavy herbicide use the only substantial way to consistently manage it. And, likewise, many landowners,
especially within Chuquisaca, expressed frustration over the inability to combat pasture infestation by other means
besides aggressive herbicide application, despite the consenting opinion that burning is far more effective and
rejuvenating. Señor Xxxxxx Alba commented on his belief of international influence within the ABT’s ruling and the
agrarian industry, asking the moral question as to why such a dictum would be instituted given how antagonistic it is
to the local producer. An average landowner needs to therefore spend thousands of dollars every other year to
ensure their lands remain productive; my key informant spends over $6K USD every alternate year on Dow
AgroSciences’ 2,4-D.
From a perspective concerning physical health, the use of compounds is becoming increasingly threatening. Señora
Xxxxxx Acuña and Señor Xxxxx Virnez expounded upon the complete lack of regulation across the spectrum of

38

agrochemical use, both in the distribution and implementation.
This was especially poignant concerning the utilization of such
amalgams, oftentimes applied by laborers, or those lacking
knowledges of consequence, without any sort of respiratory or
skin protection, oftentimes being mixed by hand. The primary
agro-chemicals used throughout Bolivia are Glyphosate, 2,4-D,
Atrazine and Paraquat, with Tordon 101 being utilized for pests;
all are criticized for their toxicity and ambiguous effect from
widespread, exhaustive application. (Field Notes)[75] Glyphosate is
more commonly used in lowland mechanized agriculture; 2,4-D
was the chemical most commonly witnessed for weed and
pasture cleaning. One only need look elsewhere to understand
the controversy and virulentness of these herbicides; many of
these chemicals in Bolivia are ‘Red-Label,’ which is the highest
international toxicity concerning human exposure. (Field Notes)
Data from the Ministry of Health in Bolivia revealed that the
“incidence of agro-chemical poisoning in Santa Cruz has
increased from 183 cases in 2010 to 475 in 2015,” with an
average of more than one a day. [75] Señora Xxxxxx Acuña
heartfeltly recounted her previous work surrounding herbicide
and pesticide distribution, speaking to the widespread uses and
damages perpetrated, but without ever knowing. She has a
daughter with Down syndrome; she believed this was caused
by her previous use and contact with these substances, a
sentiment that was reflected in her community by other mothers
with children also afflicted by Down syndrome, and also in close
contact with such agrarian product distribution and utilization.
Glyphosate is imported from Argentina; Señora Xxxxxx Acuña
voiced that the distribution of the specific product used in Bolivia
is banned there. Likewise, Señor Xxxxx Cabrera spoke of
‘Burton 100,’ an alternative to the pesticide Tordon 101, but
which was prohibited in Bolivia, despite its lower toxicity and
cheaper price. In combination with the trade sanctions,
governmental bars, and distribution controls, the notion of
market capture in Bolivia by the agrochemical giants of the
world becomes especially conspicuous, at considerable cost to
the welfare of those unknowingly using such potentially
damaging substances. The lack of education and regulation, in
Figure 18: A worker sprays herbicide in an attempt to
conjunction with such widespread application, means that the
agro-chemical industry is largely unhampered, allowing the abuse combat pasture takeover. Workers most often do not
wear any protection against such agrochemicals.
and manipulation of a susceptible, but dependable market. This
once again speaks to the state of market exploitation in Bolivia,
and the element of northern influence exerting a cruel hold over southern market liberties. Chemical use has
considerable relevance within the climate discussion, especially given the impacts to water and soil quality through
nutrient and mineral leaching, and the indirect emissions from application and soil degradation. Señor Xxxxxx Alba,
in parallel with my key informant, bemusingly questioned the disappearance of fish within the many local rivers in
Chuquisaca, citing their prolific presence only years before - both attributed their decline in part to the drastic
increases in pesticide use and invariant rainfalls. Yet, more so, the market mechanisms that perpetuate such divides
and ecological disparities in Bolivia, such as within the agro-chemical trade, speak to the underlying story that has
chastised a climate crisis; a story continually upheld, written between the lines of international economic and political
rhetoric.
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Government Overstep & Profiteering
Throughout the course of local conversation is an underlying tenor of government discontentment. Many of those that
participated in the interviews expressed distress due to the abuse of governmental authority upon their lands and
productions. This was especially common in Chuquisaca, where the ABT is instigating corrupt measures to overtax
smallholder land owners for previously deforested areas, oftentimes cleared by a previous generation. Land
ownership in Chuquisaca was most often multi-generational; lands were inherited from one's parents, and continued
to be cultivated throughout the lifetime of the current generation. Given the dramatic relief of the lands in these
mountainous foothills, forest clearing is a painstakingly slow process, done by hand over long periods of time.
Meaning that many previous generations did not have a permit, which was not necessary during that time to do the
desmonte. But even those that did, and still retain those permits, are being taxed by the ABT. Señora Xxxxx Cruz
spoke of the hardship that the ABT was putting her family through, even though she possesses the receipts and bank
statements from her father's land clearings; she had all the proof necessary, but it was ineffectual against their
demands. Señor Xxxxxx Trutille was charged 45k Bs ($6,465USD, 44.5USD/hA) for 145 hA of previously cleared
lands, an amount great enough to severely harm many local land owners. He even commented on being taxed for
natural erosion, where heavy rain events washed away a portion of steep, unusable forest. The ABT will also charge
for the cleaning of one’s lands, if the foliage has grown beyond the application of herbicide (usually taking three
years). And if one cleans these lands without said permission, despite the need to produce, the ABT has authority to
seize the lands, reverting them to State ownership. It is important to remember the scale of these lands - only roughly
30% of the total land owned by an individual can be cleared and cultivated, with the rest being too precipitous. In a
national context, these landowners have contributed but a fraction of a percent to the total emissions and
environmental degradation now apparent, yet they are being penalized the most harshly. And this was not an
improbable occurrence; every single individual spoken to in the Department of Chuquisaca specifically cited the
abuses of the ABT as one of their primary sources of challenge and strife. However, as upheld by the moral
philosophy of the MAS, those of an indigenous heritage are untouched by these rulings, thus exacerbating social
strife. Finally, in order to persuade an artificial mantra of environmentalism, the ABT requires a certain percent (~4%)
of lands to be reforested, usually amounting to 5 hA. For a local landowner, the prospect of devoting such labor and
finances is a fruitless insult; reforestation would only sequester a fraction of the original forest’s carbon, and would
consume a considerable portion of time and energy. This is based on the Law of Support to Food Production and
Forest Restitution, No. 337, which legalized land clearings in the name of food security and productivity, but which
has been conveniently evaded by the larger-scale producers within the Bolivian lowlands. In effect, such a stipulation
stands as an inconvenience of drastic character, and effectively null concerning any realistic climatic action.
This is the incongruence of the governmental body in Bolivia. The ABT was established as a national forestry and
environmental regulatory body to oversee all deforestation and agrarian operations. But their corruption, just like
much of the greater MAS administration, is evident; they ignore the perpetrators of the greatest damages but
prosecute those more vulnerable, with the smallest stake in ecological mistreatment. Señor Xxxxxx Ferrolino spoke
of nearly being imprisoned for his resistance to such trumped taxes. And the ABT is endowed with an unregulated
power; they can repossess any lands, no matter their history, under the rulings of a socialist constitution. Meaning
that these landowners are caught within a vicious dilemma: stand for their lands, families and livelihoods, and face
confiscation of their resources, or submit to the appealings of a corrupt agency, and equally face financial
consequence. The contrary agenda of the ABT is but one of the many facets of a socialist government that still is
written upon the closeted dogma of neoliberal policy; old ways which reap a considerable margin of profit for a select
few are notoriously problematic to eradicate.
Another element of external power was alluded to through the persistence of oil exploration by the Shell Corporation
within Chuquisaca. The MAS has propagated an agenda of resource nationalization, through hydrocarbon
developments by and for the Bolivian peoples. Yet, this has only partially been realized, despite a previously marked
increase in extractive industry reclamation by the MAS government. Since 2014, which signaled a decline in
hydrocarbon reserves, Bolivia has looked towards boosting international investment, given the pronounced
downward trend following the administration shift in 2006. [89] Effectively nationalizing resources can boost internal
revenues considerably in the short term, but can subsequently tax the national security of resource surplus and
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development if the technologies are not accessible without foreign capital. Thus, in union with a venal governmental
body, foreign corporate exploratory agents remain present, albeit obscured, within the Bolivian agenda of resource
extraction. Many of the landowners spoken with remarked on the presence of Shell industry workers, with the help of
the government, being upon or near their lands throughout the year of 2018 doing exploratory drilling for oil. This was
primarily through the use of dynamite within perforation studies; seismographic charges are utilized to test for the
presence of oil by fracturing the porous material within which raw oils might reside. [30] And while this practice is
theoretically acceptable, many of these landowners spoke to their disregard for exploration too near natural water
resources. As such, many of the involved landowners experienced a resulting, impactful contamination of their water
supplies, either within the groundwater or surface waters on their property. This also entailed an overall reduction in
their accessible water; Dr. Xxxxxxx Aguirre and Señor Xxxxxx Trutille specifically commented on the significance of
water availability decreases they had experienced following the Shell explorations. Through such measures, the MAS
demonstrated an indifference towards smallholder concerns, favoring instead the potential for financial gain through
the misuse of common environmental resources. These landowners had no capacity or power to protest against such
provocations; their lands were trodden upon with complete ‘legality.’ To their understanding, drilling and extraction of
crude oil will begin in Chuquisaca in April or May of 2019; an industry that is sure to alter the dynamics of such a
remote and interconnected locality, and likely bring further deterioration of their ecological assets.
Likewise, near the town of Abapo, in the southern Santa Cruz lowlands lies the Río Grande - a river that carries a
significant portion of water from the valleys of Cochabamba, flowing north through the lowland Departments. Over
the previous year, the State has been constructing a dam to facilitate hydroelectric power and irrigational capacities both are positive advancements for the given area, despite the unspoken flooding of certain local land ownerships.
Only 11% of the arable land in Bolivia is irrigated, mostly through the rudimental use of rainfed canals; access to
consistent, dependable water reserves, in parallel with close proximity to markets and rich lands would give the
properties around Abapo a considerable profit potential. It was therefore rumored amongst local landowners that
government individuals, through proxy actors, were heavily investing in the area. Every landowner in the area had
been asked to sell their land to a common individual, who owned a significant stake of land already, and had cleared
7,000 hA of forests in 2018. Señor Xxxxxxx Marquez cited his belief in this partnership within the government (this
individual owned neighboring land) through their seemingly endless amount of money; they had just recently lost
what was estimated to be nearly a million dollars (US), from a failed planting of corn and sorghum, but were still
looking to buy up more of the land in the immediate area. Once the dam is finished, and irrigated water available,
these lands will become progressively more productive. The growing of mombasa grass could allow cattle feedlots
equivalent to twenty-five head per hectare, or two consistent harvests per annum - yields that could net tens of
millions of dollars a year to any large-scale land owner in the immediate area. Interviewees spoke of other instances
where government individuals had been known to own massive land holdings, under different names, so as not to
cause controversy against the principles of socialism. They then use or steal public funds to supply their lands,
reaping the benefits, while letting the harm fall back on the reserves and people should exploits fail.
These directorate subversions might not directly seem to have any merit concerning a changing climate, but the
essential coda is written within the underlying ideology present. Policy stands as the forefront instrument to any
reasonable and meaningful environmental evolution; the potential for adaption and amendment is held upon the
principles of the current administration. Change cannot come about if the powers in place act antagonistically to the
interests of the common person and the environmental assets upon which so many of the country’s inhabitants
depend.
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Legislative Antagonism
Throughout the entirety of legislation surrounding Bolivian climate action and mitigation, there is absolute dichotomy
between capitalistic dependence and economic development. The INDC of 2015, for example, states:
“The structural cause that has triggered the climate crisis is the failed capitalist system. The capitalist system
promotes consumerism, war-mongering and commercialism, causing the destruction of Mother Earth and
humanity. The capitalist system is a system of death. Hence, capitalism is leading humanity towards a
horizon of destruction that sentences nature and life itself to death. In this regard, for a lasting solution to the
climate crisis we must destroy capitalism.” [92]
This lends itself to a quintessential argument concerning the balance between democratic capitalism and the
environment from which the market prospers. Naomi Klein, a prominent climate advocate who has framed the
argument as ‘Capitalism vs. the Climate’ argues that, thus far, “market-based solutions have largely been a failure at
creating the type of U-turn on emissions that the science requires.” [121] Yet, how can Bolivia raise its people out of
extreme poverty without relying on a system of resource extraction based within a democratically capitalistic market?
This leads to the intrinsically underlying morality of climate change. Bolivia consistently falls within the top five poorest
countries in the Western Hemisphere, with an average Gross National Income (GNI) per capita/year in 2012 - at the
time of the Mother Earth Law - of ~$2220 USD, having now risen to ~$3394 USD. [108][118] The natural resources in
Bolivia are vast and have the monetary power to bring Bolivia from a struggling ‘3rd World’ to a developed country. In
line with the agenda of the INDC of 2015, Bolivia is choosing to weigh the nationalist interests of the country over the
interests of global climate participation. Instead, they proposed a ‘Climate Justice Index,’ (in line with the ‘International
Court of Justice Climate and Mother Earth’ proposal) that calls for the equitable and fair sharing of the global carbon
emissions budget, imparted through the following conditions: [64][92]
1.
2.

3.

4.

Historical Responsibility: Taking into account the cumulative emissions since the pre-industrial era (1750
onwards), this would put the onus on those that have historically emitted the lion's share of CO2e.
Ecological Footprint: A calculation based on the resources available - such as land, water, and forests - that are
needed to satisfy the amount of goods consumed. This would disproportionately favor developing countries
given the imbalance of available natural resources versus those ‘necessarily’ utilized.
Capacity Development: Representing the condition of social and economic maturation within a given country,
this effectively declares countries on the trailing end of development across the global criterion more warranted
of prosperous, carbon emissive growth.
Technological Capacity: A measurement of a country's’ ability, given technological capacity from research and
development, as well as industrial performance, to implement, produce and export goods with ‘high technology’
(not explicitly defined).

This index justly determines the necessary efforts required by each country in order to stay within corresponding
remnant emissions budget. It effectively implies that the countries with a high historical role of atmospheric
contamination, ecological impact, and substantiated development from technological advancements have a smaller
share of the remaining carbon budget, which is set at 650 GtCO2e (and now further reduced), in order to remain below
1.5℃. [57] As a result of this indexing proposal, “non-Annex I countries would have a total of 89% of the budget and
Annex I countries only 11%.” [93] In effect, Bolivia is decisively stating that the responsibility of climate change mitigation
is not upon their shoulders, but instead upon those directly responsible. From their viewpoint, they deserve the
opportunity to develop equally, and to raise many of the country's citizens out of hardship. Such a stance is momentous,
as the forests of Bolivia are still a vital carbon sink and an integral part of the climate change mitigation solution.
Since the election of President Evo Morales, legislation propagated a considerable upheaval to traditional environmental
efficacy, bringing about a political air demonstrative of economic and social welfare. Despite his controversies, Morales
has measurably changed the lives of the country’s poorest, despite being at the avail of the raw resources within
Bolivia’s borders. But he has shown considerable waxing on environmentally sustainable advocacy throughout the
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course of his presidency. When Morales first
took office, his policy and outlook followed that of
environmental conservation for the betterment of
his people. But this has slowly shifted, where it
now appears that Morales views the
environmental diversity and vulnerability only as
a resource to promulgate continued economic
development. Under his discretion, the Bolivian
government recently signed a decree allowing
foreign energy companies to explore for
hydrocarbons, as well as build a controversial
and immense hydroelectric dam that would
displace native communities in Parque Madidi,
an area of significant biodiversity. [16] When
approached for comment, Morales stated
“Bolivia must use its natural resources to pull
people out of poverty and cannot afford to play
‘park ranger’ over its forests for wealthy northern
countries.” [16] Subsequently, Bolivia harshly
opposes the commoditization of natural
resources, especially concerning carbon offsets,
by wealthier countries. Consequently, it might be
argued that Morales’ actions are partly in
defense of himself. President Morales was
elected in 2006, and has since served three
consecutive terms, the longest of any president
in Bolivia’s history. In 2016, he lost a referendum
to run again, so he utilized the courts to disband
presidential term limits. As an indigenous person
himself, this caused incredible retaliation
because Morales was violating a basic tenet of
the indigenous people, that being power sharing.
[19]
As such, many are beginning to argue that his
presidency is starting to show tendencies
towards an authoritarian regime. Given that the
INDC of 2015 was written entirely by the
Morales’ governmental body, there exists the
potential that the rhetoric of the document has a
subversive agenda to continue his reign of
power, which is especially poignant considering
the extensive language calling for the end of
capitalism, and the systems of government
which promote such an ‘environmentally
destructive system.’ Morales’ agenda concerning
environmental efficacy and justice might instead
be an unscrupulous campaign to maintain
detrimental resource extraction practices that
unevenly benefit the wealthy and foreign
multinationals. The presidential election - which
could instate Morales’ fourth term - will occur in
October of 2019.
Figure 19: The forests of Chuquisaca.
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Social Injustice & Imbalance
The cruelest irony of a changing climate is inscribed amongst injustices that disproportionately target poor and
minority populations. Especially apparent within Bolivia, these divides manifest the majority of climate vitiation upon
the independent producer with the greatest potential loss at stake. Many of those spoken to understood such
variations often as unfortunate, luckless years of production, usually within a cyclical manner of prolific and poor
harvest. But fewer understood the implications of a global carbon allocation, of which has been disproportionately
consumed by developed northern countries at a collective expense. Some, such as Señor Xxxx Aguirre, believed
these changes were in part equated with the moon; Señor Xxxxxx Alba remarked on a previously ubiquitous use of
the Bristol, or lunar guide, to track seasons and times of planting and harvest. Others, such as Señor Xxxxx Pedraza,
voiced their beliefs that such happenings were acts of God as reparations upon the local peoples, with rogativas (or
plegarias) then being performed in times of direness to ask God for help. Given the combination of being situated in
the tropics, a region expected to sustain a considerable brunt of climatic repercussion, and being a generally
impecunious country, future climate alterations will continue to incommensurately affect Bolivia. [57] Considering
approximately one-third of the country's labor force works directly within the agriculture sector, Bolivia is considered
to be ‘extremely vulnerable’ to climate change by the World Bank, when contrasted with the adaptability of other
countries. [14][102] Many of those spoken with in the Department of Chuquisaca, one of Bolivia’s more remote and
impoverished regions, indicate that in times of hardship or market instability, they are increasingly producing just to
feed themselves. [14] Therefore it might be contended that a greater presence of climatically induced shifts will begin
to impel more small-scale producers to become subsistence farmers, no longer able to foster a yield beyond the
margins of nutritional sustain. Signifying that those of the most modest means are faced with the gravest of
transformations.
Climate change, in and amongst the spectrum of social injustices, might also behold certain transformations
concerning aggregated power and fiscal leverage. As previously deliberated, the environs surrounding agrarian
production in Bolivia could see a shift to a greater reliance on large-scale mechanized agriculture and ranching further subverting smallholder production - because of the materialization of more severe production impairment
given climatic variation. Essentially, those with greater monetary concentrations have a much more heightened
potential to adapt, which encourages monopolization and single commodity intensification through loss of producer
diversification. This is being commonly witnessed in the Santa Cruz lowlands through land rents; land accumulation
within the hands of the few has impelled land prices skyward, driving smallholders to the expansion zones and to
less productive regions. Therefore, many small-scale producers are forced to rent lands, at the mercy of price
gouging and lack of regulation. It is estimated that transnational capital owns and rents more than a million hectares
of the best agricultural and pastoral lands in Bolivia. [123] Small-scale farmers and ranchers net as little as twenty
percent of these profits, after expenses, given the exorbitant costs born upon those without land tenure and access
to mechanical or technological assistance, thus leaving them self-reliant and financially powerlessness. [76] This is
largely possible because of the dearth encompassing price fixation; monetarily remunerative shareholders can hold
influence and force upon the dependent and susceptive smallholder. Without future changes to the political
leniencies surrounding multinational investment and maltreatment, the present precincts concerning the agrarian
sector could observe a continued accrual of land, technological and fiscal resources, thereby further perpetuating the
income divide already present within the country, with the poor becoming poorer and the wealthy becoming
wealthier. And, naturally, capital accumulation within natural resource reliant industries often comes at the expense
of forest systems, ecological diversity, and elevated carbon emissions. Climate change can therefore be addressed
as a failing of market mechanisms by the affluent, with such impacts substantiated by the fiscally indigent.
And thus the lineage of colonial imbalance continues; the northern world indignant to their exploits and the south
helpless against the resulting repercussions. If the consequences of a changing climate were only superficial, and an
explicably resolute passing, then mayhaps we as a species might already have addressed such encumbrance. But
these current effects are subtly written amongst the very truths we hold to be self-evident, in and amongst a
collection of individuals so diversely interconnected. The divergence inscribed amongst the countries and populations
of this Earth, and the systems of associated values are both the root of our anthropogenic crisis and the nature of our
humanistic earnestness. Such are the divides written in Bolivia, both amongst the people and comparatively against
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those of an outsider origin. In A Theory of Human
Motivation, Abraham Maslow spoke of a ‘Hierarchy of
Needs,’ in that the developments of human need,
desire and self-satisfaction were only possible if the
previous conditions of more innate necessities were
first sated. [73] In many ways, this can be applied to the
spectrum of human development, within conditions
prenatal. However, the qualifier of the surrounding
systems within which the individual resides is largely
neglected within such context; natural resources within
and across the world provide nearly the entirety of tools
in which the individual can ascend these needs. And
forest expanses are by-in-large an influential amenity
within these growths, such that those of a northern
temperament may now value the forests for different
characteristics and virtues than those of a southern,
developing disposition. This widening divide between
values has created a sense of antagonistic action,
whereby “the world has blamed the poverty of its native
inhabitants,” which fuels a purposeful ignorance of the
social and ecological benefits of shifting cultivation. [27]
This effectively means that the affluent world - from
their dominant, egoistic perspectives - fails to recognize
the virtues conferred through raw, natural resource use,
because they proclaim from an advantageous level of
development that values the lands beyond an
intrinsically materialistic worth. Naturally, this diverts
attention from the broader political and economic forces
at play, masking the need for changes against the
agencies that govern societies, discriminatorily shifting
attention towards forest dwellers, and their exploits
within and at the expense of these forests. The irony
resides within this disassociated value; those of a
developed mentality were gifted such recompense
because of a development equally built upon such
utilization, but of a forgone occurrence. We, of the
northern world, of a developed and comfortable life, are
allowed the privileges that recognize natural
ecosystems beyond their extractive value, all the while
failing to recognize our previous happenings and our
continued reliance on outlying, externalized networks of
capital-driven extrication. It is undeniable that the more
profitable the development of a given area is, the more
likely external and political forces will be at play, often
asserting domineering force antithetical to local
wellbeing and progression. [27] Bolivia is a story
strikingly hewn from such measures, but it is one
repeatedly told throughout the world. And it is largely
why such harms are now being felt amongst the
population, yet an evil equally inferred upon the actions
of those that seek a better way of life.
Figure 20: A failed maize harvest, where drought quashed the
entirety of the planting.
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Conclusion
In Llapallapani, the Uru, a fishing people of the Bolivian altiplano, watched Lake Poopó finally vanish in 2016. Under the
watch of Morales’ government, which has been heavily diverting the water to subsidize large farms, as well as from
impacts of high elevation desertification, the once second largest lake in Bolivia took with it the hope and livelihoods of a
once thriving native community. [18] In 2009, in La Paz, the Chacaltaya glacier finally withered out of existence, taking
with it the country’s only ski area, and imparting a sobering reality concerning the rapidly melting glaciers, now of which
only 50% remain. [21] All across the country - especially shown through the testimonies of the many locals that
participated in this project - the ravishing effects of a changing climate are beginning to show, bringing challenge and
strife never before confronted, which has become particularly relevant within lowland agricultural cultivation. It is
undeniable that the present challenges are largely not of their own making, despite being partially precipitated by the
cumulative effects of a history of industrial utilization from wealthier countries. And yet Bolivia’s government is choosing
to take a reactionary stance toward climatic impacts, effectively subverting sustainable advocacy given the interest of
profitable natural resource exploitation. For the cultures, communities, livelihoods, and prosperity of the people, this air
of climate defensiveness needs to shift to an adaptive, and hopefully even collaborative, approach.
There exists considerable provocation with an international power, especially those of a wealthier disposition, advising
Bolivia on the perceived best course of action. It is, in essence, the pretext of the ‘white man’s burden,’ whereby those
of a more well-off temperament believe they have a moral duty to help those in dire circumstances. But this notion of
‘do-good’ is destructive and prejudiced, based on a belief of technological, personal, and democratic superiority. And as
such why a conclusive recommendation is largely avoided by the author. Yet, how does an international body advise
countries such as Bolivia on the best course of action, in a holistically global context? In this exists a perfect moral
storm, such that it is of a mandatory nature that all nations in alignment with Bolivia's development understand their
consequential influence upon the global carbon budget. Conversely, how do we do so without continuing to persuade
the imbalances of developed and developing nations? Ignoring the disproportionate injustices of climate change, it is
imperative that the developing countries align with a uniform, global climate action plan. Otherwise, in our defensiveness
as a species, we will have brought about irreversible effects to the lands, atmosphere, and livelihoods of every individual
on this planet.
Bolivia, and the government under Evo Morales, has a responsibility to cooperate and engage with international law and
policy regarding our changing world. If not for any international motivator, Morales must act for his people, as a steward
of the land and protector of the many varied communities that live and prosper from the abundant and diverse resources
within Bolivia’s borders. The whitewashed laws of environmental efficacy, which have been countlessly subverted, must
be stripped down to concrete, defensible policy. Bolivia, just like the many other developing nations at such crossroads,
needs to act with a tenor of defensive protection towards their natural resources, and before such a threshold is reached
that irreversible damage prevails. Such ethics are not simply the ineffectual ‘do-good’ pandering of the affluent, but a
stated recognition that sustainable action serves as the most utilitarian progression for a resource-rich and
underdeveloped country. Additionally, the capitalist institution, despite its many apparent drawbacks, has the aptitude to
provide responsive and pragmatic solutions to the climate dilemma, through technological cooperation. International
governments, NGOs, and other advising bodies must serve with a holistic desire to help by seeking to participate,
without the premise that they are providing a solution or an answer. In effect, the potential for Bolivia to revolutionize its
economic law is just as conceivable as a disastrous impairment to the myriad natural resources found within the
country. The future is uncertain, undoubtedly, for Bolivia, but international aid and council must demonstrate a rhetoric in
congruence with the best interests of the countries populous and environmental assets. Otherwise, a country of
considerable significance might be further lost to the dissident interests of those that do not envision a sustainable
future.

Figure 21: Cattle stampede while being rounded up for the markets.
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Truly, the Bolivian narrative encompassing land use and land-use change is one
of conflict, drawn taut between the consequences of a nation cut down at the
knees by multinational participation and the conversive reliance on preferential
markets. The economy is in many ways propagated by inter-border trade, at the
ultimate costs of natural resources and social equalities. But this is the story of
Bolivia’s identity, and the individuality that so uniquely defines this country.
Currently, just as with many other countries, Bolivia is largely a proxy for others
through their concessionary legislature and weak environmental efficacy, acting
disingenuously to the best intent needed by the nationals. There is no singular
conclusion, but if Bolivia can work towards a reclamation of their natural
resources by instating a rhetoric that values these reserves, then they might take
hold of their lands once more. This could largely be achieved through socioeconomic and political modifications; potential internal changes could come
through the inclusive use of (potentially nationally) independently-developed
genetically modified seeds, abolishment or reduction in fuel subsidies, dietary
changes to decrease a direct reliance on red meats, and an adoption of a
community-based conservation platform, whereby sustainability is not inimical to
development and welfare. But such adjustments cannot be at the expense of
northern aid, thus upholding relations of dependence; methods such as forest
conservation through offset or eco-tourism are largely reliant on financial input of
an external origin. Conversely, other countries could embrace more open
technology sharing, forthrightly champion international unity, and relearn what it
means to eat locally, so as not to nourish oneself at the expense of others. Many
of those spoken with simply felt that a more communal sense of togetherness
would alleviate the combative, eccentric actions enforced legislatively and
through the markets; a commonality amongst people and countries, and a
recognition of our plurality amongst a changing climate is critical to
collaboratively addressing such challenges.
The innumerable and inequitable realities of a changing climate are not blatantly
obvious, but a history entwined within the passings and governances of human
veracity; a conclusion to the evolutionary condition of a collectively
anthropomorphic population. Effectively, climate change is the successive result
of being human. The derivation of climate change is subtle, hidden amongst the
political, economic, and social progressions that are built upon to forge the state
within which we live. It is the unintended consequence of a biography written
within the struggling, sacrifices and successes of progression, inexplicably and
unavoidably at the expense of the natural systems. And at this core, the
developmental model of every society - and country - is similar, persisting within
a framework where the natural assets are outliers to the vacuous systems of
currency within which we govern our plural existences. We find ourselves
amongst such a conundrum because it is the unintended result of a way of life
that seemingly has no other recourse. We criticize these systems of extraction,
but they have largely feed and sustained us; in many ways we need them
because we don’t know how to survive elsewise. Yet what do we do; where do
we go from here; how do we restructure models of development that have been
upheld across centuries? Maybe all we can begin with is listening. To the many
others that might be more taxed and to those interconnected to their lands.
There is no perfect answer, such is the nature of the beast, but amongst the
subtleties are traces of hope. The answer, simply, lies within hearing the people their own stories and struggle - and not the money, despite its more forceful
declaration. And in actively engaging with an open mantra of cohesion.
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